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INTRODUCTION
The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees' con-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank the Fulbright
Program and the Brooklyn Law School Sabbatical and Summer Grant Programs for funding
this research. In addition, the author gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of
Rudolf Klever, Peter Nicolaus, and the ZDWF staff, all of whom provided helpful insight into
refugee law in the Federal Republic of Germany; Jacqueline Rishty and David Weinreb, who
provided research assistance; and Deborah Vester, James Cleary, Nancy Cagar, and Annette
Hasapidis, who assisted with the translations.
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugees Convention]. The scope of protection of the Geneva
Convention was considerably broadened by the Protocol of 1967 Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol]. -
Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention expressly refers only to refugees resulting from
events that occurred prior to January 1, 1951. The Protocol was drafted to protect persons
who became refugees as a result of events occurring after January 1, 1951. Protocol, Jan. 31,
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tains the most widely accepted legal definition of refugee status.2 The
Convention definition includes individuals who face a well-founded fear
of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, and political opinion.3 Persecution based on mem-
bership in a particular social group is perhaps the most obscure concept
in the refugee definition. Scholars, practitioners, and jurists have been
puzzled by its meaning. The commentary on this term is sparse. There
are relatively few judicial opinions dealing with social group based perse-
cution; only a minuscule number of the opinions attempt to analyze the
meaning of particular social group in this context. Consequently, this
portion of the Convention refugee definition is underutilized.
This examination of the legal developments in Europe concerning per-
secution based on membership in a social group clarifies this category for
the use of practitioners in the future. The research uncovered a body of
judicial decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany that are of interest
to scholars and refugee advocates in the United States and elsewhere.
Many of these cases present compelling factual bases and novel legal
claims. Beyond that, the opinions are illuminating because they reveal
the issues that interest the judges and the facts that engage their sympa-
thy. In addition, the attempts by several courts to articulate a definition
1967, art. 1. See G.A. Res. 2198, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). The Protocol changes the 1951 time deadline in Article 1 and incorporates Articles 2
through 34 of the 1951 Refugees Convention.
2. Four nations, Madagascar, Monaco, Mozambique, and Samoa, have signed the 1951
Refugees Convention only. Four nations, Cape Verde, Swaziland, the United States, and Ven-
ezuela, have signed the 1967 Protocol only. Ninety-seven other nations have signed both the
Protocol and the 1951 Refugees Convention. UNHCR Manual, Annex I (rev. January 4,
1989).
3. Article I(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugees Convention states:
The term "refugee" shall apply to any person who [a]s a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwill-
ing to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing The Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, in contrast, has set forth a broader definition of the term "refu-
gee." Opened for signature Sept. 10, 1969. Thus, in addition to the Geneva Convention defini-
tion, Art. I (2) of the OAU Convention states that:
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of
origin or nationality.
The OAU's definition, however, has met with limited acceptance. Though drafted to alleviate
the refugee problem on the African continent and signed by 25 African countries (as of Dec.
31, 1982), no action has been taken elsewhere to adopt this definition. G. GOODWIN-GILL,
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (1983).
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of a particular social group for purposes of the refugee definition suggest
some new ways of approaching this legal issue.
I. REFUGEE LAW RESEARCH IN EUROPE: Focus ON THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A. Western European Refugee Law
In Western European countries, the social group concept of persecu-
tion is even less developed than it is in the United States.4 For example,
in the Netherlands there are only three decisions that explicitly mention
a claim of persecution based on membership in a particular social group.5
In Denmark, refugee advocates consider cases granting asylum to state-
less Kurdish asylum-seekers to fall within the social group provision of
the refugee definition, but the Refugee Board has neither identified the
Kurds as a particular social group nor attempted to define persecution
based on social group.6 In Belgium there are no published decisions ex-
amining claims of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion, much less social group.7 The situation is similar in
4. In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, supra note 1, and thereby agreed to recognize as refugees those individuals with a well-
founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. This refugee definition
was added by amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(42), as amended by The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
There have been a few, but not many, judicial decisions interpreting the particular social
group aspect of the refugee definition. See, e.g., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1987); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS,
766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985); Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1984); see also In
re Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
5. In the Netherlands, the Council of State, the highest court in which cases concerning
refugee status can be brought, indicated that in certain societies homosexuals could be viewed
as a particular social group for purposes of the Geneva Convention refugee definition. Judg-
ment of Aug. 13, 1981, Afdeling Rechtspraak van de Raad van State [RvSt.] [Judicial Division
of State] (Supreme Administrative Court), Neth. In a case concerning a Rumanian man mar-
ried to a Polish woman, the Council of State mentioned that the group of citizens married to
foreigners might constitute a particular social group. Judgment of Feb. 2, 1984, RvSt. In
addition to these two decisions, the president of the district court of Haarlem ruled that in
certain instances women may constitute a particular social group. The court concluded that
the asylum-seeker in the instant case, a woman from Iran whose insufficiently traditional de-
meanor had led to her expulsion from the university and to intimidating visits from members
of the revolutionary guard to her home, had failed to submit sufficient evidence to warrant a
grant of asylum. Judgment of Nov. 19, 1985, RvSt., President Rechtbank [Pres. Rb.] Haarlen
(court of first instance).
6. Letter from Gunnar Homann, Attorney (Aug. 18, 1988) (absence of Refugee Board
identification indicates lack of definition) (copy on file at author's office).
7. Until 1988 the Representative to Belgium from the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) decided the claims to refugee status filed by asylum-
seekers in Belgium. ArrWt6 ministriel du 22fivrier 1954 relatif d la compitence du diligud en
Belgique du Haut Commissaire des Nations- Unies pour les refugids pour ddterminer la qualitd
de refugid [Ministerial Decree of Feb. 22, 1954 Relating to the Competence to Determine
Refugee Status of the Representative in Belgium of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees], 1954 Moniteur Beige 3124. Under the prior law, Loi du 15 ddcembre 1980 sur
I'accds au territorie, le sijour, l'dtablissement et Ploignement des itrangers [Law of Dec. 15,
1980 on Access to the Territory, Sojourn, Establishment, and Removal of Aliens], 1980
1990]
384 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
many other European countries.'
In large part the lack of developed case law is due to the government
systems established to review applications for asylum. An administrative
process with little or no judicial review is the norm. In Denmark, for
example, judicial review of a decision denying refugee status is com-
pletely unavailable.' The same is true in Sweden,"0 and was the case in
Belgium." In England, judicial review of asylum claims occurs only in
the exceptional situation."2 In the Netherlands the asylum process is
Moniteur Beige 14,584, there was no requirement that the UNHCR decisions on refugee status
provide reasons for their conclusions and the decisions were not subject to judicial review.
European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, Asylum in Europe, 69, 18, 1983. In 1987
new legislation, Loi du 14juillet 1987 apportant des modifications, en ce qui concerne notam-
ment les refugis, d la loi du 15 dicembre 1980 sur i'accos au territoire, le sejour, l'dtablissement
et l'dloignement des etrangers [Law of July 14, 1987 Modifying, with Particular Regard to
Refugees, the Law of Dec. 15, 1980 Concerning Access to the Territory, Sojourn, Establish-
ment and Removal of Aliens], 1987 Moniteur Beige, 11,111, totally revamped the process
(originally reported as the Law of July 15, 1987, the date of the legislation was subsequently
corrected to Law of July 14, 1987). The newly created Office for Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons must explain the reasons it fails to recognize refugee status. Id. art. 57/6. Administrative
and judicial review is now available. Id. art. 57/11-57/23. The refugee determination proce-
dures outlined by the 1987 legislation did not go into effect until 1988. Id. art. 25 (conse-
quently, the new system has not yet had time to result in opinions analyzing membership in a
particular social group). See Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers, 29 VA. J.
INTL. L. 33, 39-54 (1988).
8. For example, in France the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons,
[Office franqais de protection des refugids et apatrides (OFPRA)] has interpreted membership in
a particular social group to refer to membership in a racial or ethnic group. Accordingly, the
social group category does not stand on its own as an independent basis for refugee status;
rather, persecution based on race or nationality subsumes persecution based on social group.
F. Julien-Laferriere, Country Report on France, European Lawyers Workshop on the Imple-
mentation of Article IA of the Geneva Convention, 11, 13 (July 1985). In Sweden decisions
on refugee status are made by the Immigration Board [Statens Invandrarverk], an administra-
tive agency. The Board's proceedings are secret and it provides no reasons for its decisions. P.
Nobel, Country Report on Sweden, European Lawyers Workshop on the Implementation of
Article IA of the Geneva Convention, 30-31 (July 1985). As a result, the refugee law jurispru-
dence concerning the bases for persecution is undeveloped.
9. UdIaendingelo yen [The Aliens Act], Act No. 226 (as amended by Act No. 232, June 6,
1985; Act No. 574, Dec. 19, 1985; and Act No. 686, Oct. 17, 1986). Section 46(2) provides
that decisions of the Directorate for Aliens may generally be appealed to the Minister of Jus-
tice. Section 48(2) of the Act further specifies that decisions concerning denial of entry to
asylum-seekers shall be appealed to the Minister of Justice from the Directorate for Aliens to
another administrative body known as the Refugee Board. Appeals pertaining to residence
permits and travel documents for refugees, not denial of entry, may be brought. Id. § 53a(l).
See M. KJAERUM, AN ASYLUM SEEKER'S WAY THROUGH THE SYSTEM 10-14 (H. Fischer
trans. 1988). See generally Fullerton, supra note 7, at 59-63.
10. Nobel, supra note 8, at 30-31; Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 316, T1 35-38.
11. Supra note 7.
12. Individuals who arrive in the United Kingdom without visas and other travel docu-
ments are generally refused entry. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 366-367, 14, 19.
Asylum-seekers lacking proper travel documents who claim refugee status generally are inter-
viewed by an immigration officer. Id. at 368, 1 27. The transcript of the interview is sent to
the Refugee Unit of the Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office. Id.
Decisions by the Refugee Unit denying refugee status are subject to administrative review by
the Immigration Appeals Adjudiciator. Id. at 368, 26. Only those who are properly docu-
mented and legally present in the United Kingdom can appeal before being removed from the
United Kingdom. Id. at 1 25. All others, which include the vast majority of asylum-seekers,
must leave the United Kingdom before an appeal will be heard. Id. In narrow circumstances,
decisions by the Immigration Appeals Adjudicator can be appealed to the Immigration Ap-
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handled by the Ministry of Justice; l" one judicial challenge to the final
decision of the Minister of Justice may be filed in the highest court, the
Council of State.'
4
B. Refugee Law in the Federal Republic of Germany
The most elaborate jurisprudence concerning refugees in Europe is in
the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Federal Republic there is an
elaborate system of judicial review of refugee decisions."5 Not surpris-
ingly, there are more German opinions examining claims of persecution
based on social group than there are combined French, Dutch, Belgian,
and English cases. As in the United States, 6 the German judicial opin-
ions reviewing social group claims to refugee status seem to be a phenom-
enon of the 1980's. From 1982 to 1985 thirteen German courts issued
decisions involving persecution based on membership in a particular so-
cial group. In addition, in 1985 the central administrative agency re-
viewing refugee claims issued an opinion involving a social group claim.
peals Tribunal, another administrative body. Id. at 26. See generally Avery, Refugee Status
Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19 STANFORD J. INTL. L. 319-325. Theoreti-
cally, judicial review of Immigration Appeals Tribunal decisions is available, but in practice
this rarely occurs. Very few refugee cases ever reach the Immigration Appeals Tribunal; any
that do can only seek judicial review on points of law. Id. at 324-325.
13. Officials of the Ministry of Justice generally hold the initial interview with an asylum-
seeker. Interview with Lex Takkenberg, Chief Legal Advisor, Dutch Refugee Council
[Vluchtelingen Werk], Amsterdam (June 22, 1987). The asylum seeker's interview reports are
summarized and sent to the Ministry of Justice, Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 251 1 18.
If the Ministry determines that there may be legitimate grounds for an asylum request, the
asylum-seeker is allowed to enter the country. Id. at 19. An asylum-seeker can ask the
Minister of Justice to reconsider a negative decision. Id. at 1 32. Before issuing a reconsidered
decision, the Minister of Justice requests the advice of the Advisory Commission for Aliens
Affairs [Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken]. Id. at 1 35. If the Minister of Justice
again issues a negative decision, the asylum-seeker can appeal to the Council of State Judicial
Department [Raad van State Afdeling Rechtspraaks], the highest court to hear challenges to
action taken by government officials. Id. at 36. See generally Asylum in Europe, supra note
7, at 74-82, 250-254, 9 14-37.
14. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 254, 1 36. Asylum-seekers denied entry to the
Netherlands can also on occasion invoke the kort geding, a special summary judicial proceed-
ing governed by informal action. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 251, 9 20, 34 and 253.
The Aliens Act contains no provision for judicial review of a decision to refuse entry at the
border. The courts, however, have ruled that judicial review is available to consider whether
the state's action refusing entry constitutes a tort. In so holding, the courts have applied the
general principles of Dutch administrative law, which, in the absence of legislative provisions
authorizing administrative or judicial review, allow parties to challenge government action by
filing tort actions in the civil courts. Letter from Lex Takkenberg, Chief Legal Advisor, Dutch
Refugee Council, Amsterdam (Sept. 28, 1988). More than 90% of the cases submitted to the
courts via the kort geding procedure result in negative decisions for the asylum-seekers. Inter-
view with Virginia Korte Van Hemel, Secretary of State for Justice, The Netherlands, reported
in Refugees, Oct. 1988, at 43. Asylum-seekers can appeal negative decisions, but filing an
appeal does not stay the decision. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 253, 34. See generally
Fullerton, supra note 7, at 76-77, 81-82. Thus, asylum-seekers who avail themselves of the kort
geding procedure manage to delay their departure from the Netherlands for a few days, but
then generally are forced to leave.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 52-73.
16. In the United States all the social group decisions have been rendered since the enact-
ment of the Refugee Act of 1980. See supra note 4.
1990]
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This German case law is a valuable potential resource, but unfortu-
nately these social group decisions have been inaccessible to most Ameri-
can lawyers. Two barriers stand in the way. The first problem is
identifying the pertinent case law. Locating decisions concerning refugee
status is no easy task. There is no centralized reporting system of lower
court opinions in the Federal Republic.' 7 However, armed with the date
and case number, one can obtain a copy of the opinion from the court
that issued it. Unfortunately, identifying the date and case number can
be tricky. There are several sources of helpful information, including
periodicals that examine refugee issues," and certain courts have a par-
ticularly good library of information on refugees.' 9 Moreover, the Cen-
tral Refugee Documentation Center2" in Bonn makes a major effort to
collect and publicize all opinions dealing with refugees. To an American
lawyer accustomed to all the federal, regional, and specialty reporters,
the legal research situation in the Federal Republic is unsettling. The
overlapping reporting systems share a common weakness: they rely on
the interested lawyer or judge to notify them of a decision. Because no
group monitors all the decisions issued by each court, a researcher in this
area lacks the sense of completeness that comes with combing all the
published opinions on a particular topic in the United States. Nonethe-
less, by thoroughly reviewing the known sources, it is possible to develop
a fairly comprehensive picture of the developing refugee law in West
Germany.
The second impediment is language. The decisions are available only
17. The collected decisions of the highest courts are published. For example, the decisions
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal Constitutional Court, are collected in a reporter
called the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen (B VerfGE). Similarly, the decisions of the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the highest administrative court, are collected and published in the
Bundesverwaltungsgerichtsentscheidungen (BVerwGE). However, identifying lower court
opinions about refugees is catch as catch can. Cases challenging action taken by a government
official must be filed in the administrative court system. The administrative court of first in-
stance, or trial court, is the Verwaltungsgericht. The Administrative Appeals Court
[Oberverwaltungsgericht or Verwaltungsgerichtshof in Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, and
Hesse] hears appeals from the Verwaltungsgericht. Each state in the Federal Republic has an
Administrative Court and an Administrative Appeals Court. The judges of both courts gener-
ally convene in panels of five (three professional judges and two lay judges) to hear a case.
Appeals from the Administrative Appeals Court may be filed in some instances with the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (the highest administrative court), which convenes in panels of five
professional judges. N. HORN, H. KaTz, & H.G. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMER-
CIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 33 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 57-78 for a
description of judicial review of agency decisions granting or denying refugee status.
18. For example, ZAR, Zeitschriftfur Ausldnderrecht und Auslknderpolitik [J. OF ALIENS
L. & POL'Y], a West German quarterly legal journal which summarizes recent court opinions
in its Rechtsprechung [Judicial Decisions] section.
19. The Administrative Court in Wiesbaden [Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden] maintains an
extensive information center on refugee matters. Avery, supra note 12, at 282-283.
20. Die Zentrale Dokumentationstelle der Freien Wohlfarhrtspflege fJir Fliichtlinge
[ZDWF] (Central Documentation Center of the Voluntary Agencies for Assistance to Refu-
gees) is located at Hans-Bbckler-Strasse 3, 5300 Bonn 3. ZDWF receives funding from volun-
tary agencies and the federal government. It maintains extensive files on refugee law and
policy in the Federal Republic and in other countries. Avery, supra note 12, at 283-284.
[Vol. 4:381,
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in German. As a result, discovering the existence of this case law does
nothing more than tantalize the non-German speaking refugee advocate.
To resolve this problem the English translations are available through
the author.21
C. Differences and Similarities of the Asylum Process in the U.S. and
the Federal Republic: An Overview
The social group cases arising in the Federal Republic contain obvious
differences from social group cases in the United States. The most strik-
ing difference lies in the asylum-seekers' countries of origin. Most of the
cases in the Federal Republic involve refugees from Eastern Europe, Af-
rica, and South Asia.22 Asylum-seekers from the Americas and from
South East Asia are not common.
23
The American lawyer will also be struck by the role of expert opinion.
In refugee cases the courts in the Federal Republic appear to give greater
deference to expert opinion than do courts in the United States.24 Defer-
ence is granted both to expert opinion from the Foreign Ministry and to
non-government experts. This stems from the German practice of hav-
ing the courts, rather than the parties, select experts who consequently
owe a duty of impartiality to the courts.2" Finally, the right of the gov-
21. The author translated the opinions, assisted by Deborah Vester, James Cleary, Nancy
Cagar, and Annette Hasapidis, research assistants proficient in German.
22. In 1986, 99,650 asylum applications were filed with the Bundestamtftir die Anerken-
nung Auslandischer Fluchtlinge [Federal Office for Recognition of Foreign Refugees], see infra
text accompanying notes 48-50. Of these applications, 25,164 were from Europe; 56,575 were
from Asia; and 9,486 were from Africa. Annual Statistics, Federal Office for the Recognition
of Foreign Refugees, January-December 1986 [hereinafter Statistics, 1986]. In 1988 the
number of asylum-seekers had decreased to 39,885, but the regions of origin remained similar:
27,114 from Europe, 9,630 from Asia, and 2,205 from Africa. Annual Statistics, Federal Of-
fice for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, January-December 1988 [hereinafter Statistics,
1988]. In 1989, there was a large increase with 121,318 asylum applications filed. Again, the
three major regions of origin were the same: 73,387 from Europe, 32,718 from Asia, and
12,479 from Africa. Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, January-Decem-
ber 1989 [hereinafter Statistics, 1989].
23. Of the 99,650 asylum applications filed with the Federal Office for Recognition of For-
eign Refugees in 1986, 142 were from Central and South America. In 1989, only 320 of the
121,318 applications were from the Americas. The 1989 applicants from Asia, totalling
32,718, included 3,137 from India, 2,673 from Pakistan, 7,758 from Sri Lanka, 3,656 from
Afghanistan; 5,768 from Iran, 1,332 from Syria, 6,240 from Lebanon, 354 from Iraq. There
were 984 applicants from Vietnam, and so few asylum-seekers from Cambodia, Laos and
China that they were not listed in the statistics. Statistics 1989. In both 1986 and 1988 there
were so few asylum-seekers from Vietnam that Vietnam did not appear as a separate category
in the statistics. Statistics, 1986, supra note 22; Statistics, 1988, supra note 22.
24. For example, in a case involving an asylum-seeker from India who alleged persecution
based on her membership in a women's rights organization and on her marriage to a man of a
lower caste, see infra text accompanying notes 120-134, the Administrative Court of Ansbach
sent questions about the situation in India to the India correspondent for a German new-
sweekly (Dr. Gabriele Vensky, correspondent for Die Zeit). Judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, No.
AN 1269-XII/79, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach [VGA], 3. The court gave great deference to
the correspondent's written response to its questions. Id., see infra notes 128-129 and accompa-
nying text.
25. HORN, supra note 17, at 49.
1990]
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ernment to seek judicial review of a decision recognizing refugee status
and granting asylum will be surprising to the American advocate.26
The most striking similarity of the two systems is the greater chance of
success for asylum-seekers who flee countries dominated by a communist
regime." Other similarities and differences are apparent in the discus-
sion of cases that follows.
II. THE REFUGEE DETERMINATION PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A. Refugee Law in the Federal Republic of Germany
In order to appreciate the context in which the German courts ex-
amine claims of refugee status based on membership in a particular social
group, it is necessary to understand the basic refugee law in the Federal
Republic. The German Constitution guarantees a right of asylum to
political refugees.2" In addition, the Federal Republic is a signatory to
the 1951 Geneva Convention.2 9 Although the Constitution refers only to
26. Gesetz tiber das Asylverfahren yom 16 Juli 1982 [Law of July 16, 1982 on Asylum
Procedure], 1982 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] I 946, § 5(2) (authorizing appeals by the
Bundesbeauftragterftir Asylangelegenheiten [Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs] of de-
cisions by Federal Refugee Office). The Asylverfahrengesetz (AsylVfG) [Asylum Procedure
Law] is the basic legislative act regulating the procedures by which asylum-seekers may enter
and seek refugee status in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is roughly analogous to the
Refugee Act of 1980 in the United States. The Asylum Procedure Law of July 16, 1982 was
modified by legislation passed on July 11, 1984. See Gesetz yom 11 Juli 1984, 1984 BGBI.I
874. It was further modified on January 6, 1987. See Gesetz zur nderung asylverfahrensrech-
tlicher und ausldnderrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 6 Januar 1987 [Law of January 6, 1987 to
Amend the Process Governing Asylum, Work Permits, and Aliens], 1987 BGBI.I 89 [herein-
after Asylum Law of 1987].
27. From June 1983 - September 1989, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
approved 27% of all asylum cases filed with District Directors in the United States. Seventy
percent of applicants from Rumania were approved, as were 47% of applicants from Czecho-
slovakia, and 38% from Poland. In contrast, only 9.5% from Lebanon, 2.5% from El Salva-
dor, 2% from Guatemala, and 2% from Haiti were approved. Refugee Reports 14 (December
29, 1989). The 1986 statistics from the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees
show that 691 Czechs were recognized as refugees and 197 rejected. Of Rumanian applicants
158 were recognized, 251 rejected. In contrast, 254 Turks were recognized, 4,872 rejected.
Similar results occurred with African and Asian nations: 140 Ethiopians recognized and 1,044
rejected; 11 Ghanaians recognized and 4,315 rejected; but 1,481 Afghanis recognized and only
384 rejected; and 1,937 Sri Lankans recognized and 6,164 rejected. Statistics 1986, supra note
22. See generally Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MIcH. J. L. Rap. 183, 205-206 (1984).
The political change occuring in Europe in 1989 and 1990, in which many communist gov-
ernments fell from power or entered into coalition governments with non-Communist parties,
have led to a recent downturn in the number of asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe recog-
nized as refugees in the Federal Republic. For example, in 1989 only 236 Czechs were granted
asylum; 845 were denied. Only 46 Rumanians were granted asylum; 2,701 were denied. Sta-
tistics, 1989, supra note 22. Nonetheless, this phenomenon does not contradict the central
issue. It underscores the correlation between asylum-seekers from communist countries and
refugee status in the Federal Republic of Germany.
28. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art. 79, § 2 ("The politically persecuted shall enjoy the right of
asylum.").
29. The Federal Republic of Germany formally signed the Convention on November 19,
1951 and ratified it on December 1, 1953. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-
[Vol. 4:381
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political persecution, the courts have interpreted the constitutional right
to asylum to include those persecuted for racial, religious, nationality,
and social group reasons, as well as those punished for their political
opinion.3 ° Thus, most asylum-seekers in Germany have a constitutional
claim in addition to their Geneva Convention claim.
1. The Asylum-Seeker
An asylum-seeker who enters the Federal Republic to seek refugee sta-
tus is assigned to one of the communal living facilities3 for those claim-
ing refugee status.3 2 Asylum-seekers are assigned to refugee facilities
throughout West Germany. The eleven states that comprise the Federal
Republic hammered out a political agreement 33 committing each state to
take a certain percentage of asylum-seekers.34 The states, in turn, assign
General U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, 181 (1987). According to the enabling legislation,
Gesetz vom 1.9. 1953 [Law of September 1, 1953] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] II 559, the terms
of the 1951 Refugee Convention came into force on April 22, 1954 pursuant to the official
notice given on April 25, 1954, BGBI.II 619 by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs. R.
MARX, G. STRATE, & V. PFAFF, Kommentar zum Asylverfahrensgesetz 15 (2d ed. 1987).
30. E.g., Judgment of March 29, 1983, No. AN 419-/78, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[VGA], 6; see infra notes 163-175 and accompanying text. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1982, No. 10
K 115/80, Verwaltungsgericht Saarland [VGS], 9; see infra notes 184-197 and accompanying
text. See Nicolaus & Klever, The Notion of the Term "Refugee" in the Laws of the Federal
Republic of Germany, European Lawyers Workshop on the Implementation of Article IA (of
the Geneva Convention 16-17 (July 1985) (arguing that the German courts too narrowly inter-
pret the constitutional right to asylum by equating the constitutional refugee definition with
the Geneva Convention refugee definition). See generally KOFNER & NICOLAUS, Grundlagen
des Asylrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Fundamentals of the Law of Asylum in the
Federal Republic of Germany] § 6.4.1 (1986).
31. Collective housing is referred to as Gemeinschaftsunterkunften. See generally
Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 202-203.
32. AsylVfG § 23 provides that asylum-seekers generally shall be housed in collective ac-
commodations [Gemeinschaftsunterkunften]. Different states and local communities have var-
ious kinds of communal housing, ranging from central camps [Sammellager] to smaller
boarding houses to accommodations in private homes. Wolken, Country Report for Federal
Republic of Germany, European Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA) Workshop, Hamburg,
6-7 (November 1986). Although asylum-seekers technically are free to leave the collective
accommodations, they receive free meals and free lodging only if they remain; Aleinikoff,
supra note 27, at 203. The new refugee legislation passed on January 6, 1987, grants more
flexibility to asylum-seekers by allowing them to live elsewhere rather than in the group ac-
commodations if they can show their alternative housing arrangements will not require a
greater expenditure of public funds. Asylum Law of 1987, art. 1, § 13, supra note 26, at 91.
33. The 16 states are Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saar, and Schleswig-Hol-
stein. Article 23 of the Constitution [Grundgesetz] of the Federal Republic of Germany in-
cludes Berlin as one of the states that comprise the Federal Republic. The legal effect of this
provision is unclear since the allied forces occupying Berlin at that time, registered an official
objection to the inclusion of Berlin as a state. For practical purposes Berlin functions as one of
the constituent states of the Federal Republic, although as a matter of political theory and
legal technicality, Berlin's status is somewhat murky. See generally C. Lush, The Relationship
Between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 742 (1965).
34. AsylVfG § 22(3) provides that the Federal Commissioner for the Distribution of Asy-
lum-seekers will allocate asylum applicants according to the following schedule unless the
states come to an alternative agreement: 15.1% to Baden-Wiirttemberg; 17.4% to Bavaria;
2.6% to Berlin; 1.3% to Bremen; 3.3% to Hamburg; 9.2% to Hesse; 11.5% to Lower Saxony;
27.9% to North Rhine-Westphalia; 5.8% to Rhineland-Palatinate; 1.8% to the Saar; 4.1% to
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asylum-seekers to various local communities.3 5 The asylum-seekers re-
ceive a residence permit for the assigned community, 36 but must seek
prior permission from the aliens police before leaving that community.3 7
Although they are subject to the geographical restrictions of the resi-
dence permit, asylum-seekers may freely enter and leave their group
housing.38 They are not allowed to seek employment, however. 39 Five
years after filing their asylum applications they can apply for a work
permit.' Even after five years a work permit is not assured. Before issu-
ing work permits the Labor Department reviews the unemployment situ-
ation in the Federal Republic to ascertain the impact of adding more
workers to the labor force.4" When the unemployment rate is high, as it
has remained in recent years,4 2 asylum-seekers rarely receive permission
to work.43
Schleswig-Holstein. Id. § 22(2). This formula is roughly based on the resources and popula-
tion of the states. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 202.
35. AsylVfG § 22(9) cited in Wolken, supra note 32, at 5.
36. AsylVfG § 20(2). The residence permit [Aufenthaltsgestattung] can be restricted to a
particular community or to a particular housing accommodation. It is always limited to the
geographical jurisdiction of the pertinent aliens authority. AsylVfG § 20(1). Wolken, supra
note 32, at 4.
37. AsylVfG § 25(1). An asylum-seeker who wishes to leave his assigned district tempo-
rarily must show compelling reasons to leave. Id. Permission is not needed to appear in court
or before other government authorities. Id. § 25(3). Permission shall be granted to allow an
asylum-seeker to meet with representatives of UNHCR and other refugee organizations. Id.
§ 25(2). See Wolken, supra note 32, at 5 for a discussion of "compelling" reasons to leave the
assigned district.
38. Although asylum-seekers may be ordered to live in a particular dwelling, the maxi-
mum geographical restriction that the government can impose on an asylum-seeker is to a
particular community. Wolken, supra note 32, at 4 (citing AsylVfG § 20(2)).
39. The Asylum Law of 1987, supra note 26, amended the Arbeitsfdrderungsgesetz yom 25
Juni 1969 [Law of June 25, 1969 to Promote Employment], 1969 BGBI.I 582 and the Arbeit-
serlaubnisverordnung vom 12 September 1980 [Regulation of Sept. 12, 1980 on Work Permits],
1980 BGBI.I 1754, to increase significantly (from two to five years) the prohibition against
employment pending resolution of an asylum claim. The prohibition against employment
forces most asylum-seekers to remain in group facilities where free food and lodging are pro-
vided. This prohibition has, of course, led to an underground labor market for asylum-seekers
awaiting recognition of their refugee status. See Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 201-202.
40. The Asylum Law of 1987, supra note 26, amends § 19 of the Law of June 25, 1969 to
promote employment and extends the prohibition against work to five years. Asylum-seekers
whose asylum applications have been rejected but who have not been ordered to depart face a
one-year waiting period before they can apply for work authorization. Amendment of Jan. 6,
1987 to Laws of Asylum, Work Permits and Aliens, art. 2, § 1, 1987 BGB1.1 at 92. Spouses of
rejected asylum-seekers who have not been ordered to leave have a four-year waiting period;
their children have a two-year wait. Id. § 19, 1(b). Prior to the 1987 amendment the legisla-
tion required a two-year waiting period for non-European applicants and a one year wait for
Eastern European applicants. Verordnung zur Anderung der Arbeitsverordnung [Regulation
Amending the Regulation on Work Permits] art. 1, sec. 2, 1981 BGB1. I 1042.
41. Letter from Rudolf K/ever, Member, Steering Committee, European Legal Network
on Asylum, to Maryellen Fullerton (Sep. 3, 1988) (discussing draft article on Persecution in
Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic of Germany) [hereinafter Klever Letter].
42. The unemployment rate in the 1980's has generally exceeded 7%. U.S. Dept. of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 554 (Table 143), August 1989.
43. Klever Letter, supra note 41.
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2. The Refugee Determination Process
Asylum-seekers begin the formal refugee determination process by fil-
ing an application with the local aliens police."
a. Local Aliens Police
The aliens police then interview the applicant to identify the outlines
of the claim.4" If the aliens police determine that the asylum-seeker has
previously filed an asylum claim in the Federal Republic and been re-
jected, the aliens police deny this new application. 46 The aliens police
will also deny the application if they discover that the asylum-seeker re-
ceived protection from persecution in another country prior to arriving
in the Federal Republic.47 In all other cases the aliens police send the
asylum application and the preliminary interview to the Federal Office
for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees.48
b. The Federal Refugee Office
The staff of the Federal Refugee Office, which is headquartered in
Zirndorf in Bavaria and has satellite offices around the country,49 makes
all the refugee determinations for the entire country.5" Staff members
interview the applicants extensively. 1 Asylum-seekers have the right to
bring an attorney and an interpreter to the interview. 2 Asylum appli-
cants may submit documentary evidence to support their claim to refu-
gee status. 3 In addition, staff members have access to the Office's
extensive collection of reports on refugee conditions compiled from gov-
ernment sources, human rights groups, non-government voluntary agen-
cies, and press accounts.5 4 The refugee's documentary evidence, expert
opinion about the conditions of the country from which the asylum-
44. AsylVfG § 8(1). Each state has its own aliens police [Ausldnderbehorde]. Asylum-
seekers must file their applications with the appropriate aliens police for the district in which
the asylum-seekers reside. Id. For a general overview of the asylum process, see generally
Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 154-159, 15-39.
45. AsylVfG § 8(2).
46. Id. at § 14.
47. Id. at § 7(2) (asylum applications must be disregarded if obvious that applicant already
found protection elsewhere).
48. Id. at § 8(3). Section 4 establishes the Federal Office for Recognition of Foreign Refu-
gees (Bundesamtfuir die Anerkennung Ausldndischer Flchtlinge). The Federal Office for Rec-
ognition of Foreign Refugees [hereinafter Federal Refugee Office] does not consider claims by
"national refugees," individuals of German descent entitled by the Constitution of the Federal
Republic [GG art. 11, 116] to live in Germany. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 154, 10.
49. There are eight satellite offices. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 204.
50. AsylVfG § 4(1).
51. Id at § 12(1).
52. Id at § 12(2) (incorporating into the Federal Refugee Office procedures the provisions
regarding counsel and interpreter assistance contained in § 8 (4) regarding the interview by the
aliens police).
53. Id at § 12(1).
54. Avery, supra note 12, at 280; Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 204-205.
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seeker is fleeing, the aliens police interview report, and the report of the
interview by the Federal Refugee Office staff comprise the record." Af-
ter reviewing the record the Federal Refugee Office staff issues a written
opinion granting or denying the applicant's claim.56
c. Judicial Review in The Federal Republic of Germany
The asylum applicant can seek judicial review of a decision denying
asylum by challenging the decision in the Administrative Court in the
state in which the asylum-seeker resides." In addition, the Federal
Commissioner for Asylum Affairs" 8 can appeal a decision granting asy-
lum.59 Although in the past the Federal Commissioner, an official ap-
pointed by the Federal Minister of the Interior, did not frequently file
appeals,' the more recent practice of the Commissioner is to appeal
most of the decisions granting asylum to applicants from non-European
countries. 6'
Filing an appeal generally stays government action to expel the appli-
cant.6" A decision by the Administrative Court denying refugee status
can be appealed to the state's Administrative Appeals Court6 3 in cases
that present important issues of law or that conflict with higher court
decisions.' The court of first instance, the state Administrative Court,
determines whether the circumstances of the case entitle the parties to
appeal, but a decision denying a right to appeal can itself be appealed to
the Administrative Appeals Court.65 A decision by the Administrative
55. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 204-205.
56. AsylVfG § 12(6).
57. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, 33.
58. AsylVfG § 5(1) establishes the position of Bundesbeauftragterftir Asylangelegenheiten
[Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs]. The Minister of the Interior appoints the Federal
Commissioner. Id. at § 5(3). The Federal Commissioner represents the federal government's
position in cases before the Federal Office and before the courts. Id. at § 5(2).
59. Asylum Law of 1987, supra note 26, at § 5(2), at 946 (authorizing the Bundesbeauf-
tragterfir Asylangelegenheiten [Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs] to appeal decisions
by the Federal Office); Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 157, 29.
60. Decisions granting asylum to applicants from Eastern European countries were rarely
appealed by the Federal Commissioner. Telephone Interview with Rudolf Klever, Member,
Steering Committee, European Legal Network on Asylum (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Klever
Interview]. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 206.
61. The vast majority of decisions granting asylum to applicants from non-Eastern Euro-
pean countries are now appealed by the Federal Commissioner. Klever Interview, supra note
60.
62. AsylVfG § 30, 1982 BGB1.I at 951; Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, 38.
Section 11(2) provides, however, that an appeal of the Federal Office's decision that an applica-
tion is manifestly unfounded does not suspend expulsion. AsylVfG § 11(2), 1982 BGB1.I at
948. Similarly, an appeal of a denial of asylum based on a finding of protection elsewhere, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text, or subsequent submission of a previously rejected asy-
lum application without new evidence, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, did not sus-
pend expulsion. AsylVfG § 10(3), 1982 BGBL.I at 947.
63. For a brief description of the court system, see supra note 17.
64. AsylVfG § 32(2), 1982 BGB1.I at 952; see also Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158,
35.
65. AsylVfG § 32(4), 1982 BGBI.I at 952; Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, 36;
[Vol. 4:381
SOCIAL GROUP DEFINED
Appeals Court denying refugee status can be appealed to the Federal Ad-
ministrative Court,6 6 the highest court that hears suits challenging gov-
ernment action.6 7 Again, the right to appeal is conditioned on the
presence of an important issue of law or a conflict with a higher court
decision.6" Lastly, cases can be filed with the highest court in the coun-
try, the Federal Constitutional Court,6 9 based on the assertion that the
constitutional guarantee of asylum has been violated.7 °
Special rules apply, however, if the Federal Refugee Office not only
rejects the application but also declares it manifestly unfounded. In that
situation the applicant must challenge this decision within one month in
a special summary proceeding at the state Administrative Court. 7' Fil-
ing this challenge does not stay a deportation order. 72 In order to pre-
vent government deportation efforts the asylum-seeker must within one
week of the negative decision by the Federal Refugee Office file a separate
application asking the court to suspend the effect of the Federal Refugee
Office's decision.7 3 If the court finds that the application is manifestly
unfounded, no further appeal is allowed. 74 If the court upholds the Fed-
eral Refugee Office decision denying the claim but concludes that it is not
manifestly unfounded, the court will authorize the asylum-seeker to pur-
sue an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Court if the court concludes
that the case presents an important issue of law or conflicts with a higher
court decision. 75 Those applicants to whom the courts deny the right to
appeal have one last chance within the court system. They may seek an
injunction from the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that the denial
of their claims violates the constitutional guarantee of protection to vic-
see generally id. at 157-58, TT 32-37; Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 209-11. To challenge the
denial of the right to appeal the asylum-seeker files a Beschwerde (summary proceeding) in the
Administrative Appeals Court.
66. Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG). For a brief description of the court system, see
supra note 18.
67. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, 37. HORN, supra note 17, at 33.
68. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, 37.
69. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court] sits in Karl-
sruhe. Sixteen judges comprise the court, which meets in panels of eight. HORN, supra note
17, at 21.
70. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, T 37.
71. AsylVfG § 11(3) (providing a 30 day limit). The asylum-seeker files a Beschwerde.
Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 155, 19.
72. AsylVfG § 11(2) (overriding § 10(3), which grants suspensive effect).
73. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VWGO) [Rules of the Administrative Courts], § 80, § V,
1986 BGBL.I 219. If the asylum-seeker does not seek a stay of the Federal Office's decision,
the aliens police may deport him or her despite the fact that the one month deadline for seek-
ing review of the decision may not yet have expired. Indeed, the aliens police may deport an
asylum-seeker who has already sought review of the decision, despite the fact that a challenge
is pending, if the asylum-seeker has not sought a stay.
74. AsylVfG § 32(6), 1982 BGBI.I at 952; Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 157-58,
32-33; see also id. at 155-56, 19.
75. AsylVfG § 32(2), 1982 BGBl.I at 951; see alsoAsylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158,
35.
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tims of political persecution."6 The Federal Constitutional Court rarely
provides relief in asylum cases, but the asylum-seeker is in a "tolerated"
status and will not be deported during the two or three months that the
case is pending." This option is not risk-free, however; the Federal Con-
stitutional Court has fined asylum-seekers for filing frivolous claims.7"
d. Deportation from the Federal Republic of Germany
Those asylum-seekers whose claims for refugee status are rejected by
the courts do not necessarily face deportation. The refugee system is bi-
furcated; a central federal agency makes all decisions about refugee sta-
tus, but deportation is left up to the individual states. Each state sets its
own deportation policy. Often a state will decide on humanitarian
grounds to allow certain groups of-asylum-seekers to remain despite the
Federal Refugee Office's rejection of their claims to refugee status. For
example, all of the states except Baden-Wiirttemburg and Bavaria have
issued directives allowing Tamils to remain.79
e. The Judicial System in the Federal Republic of Germany
To appreciate the opinions described below, it is helpful to know that
an asylum-seeker's hearing before the state Administrative Court is quite
different from the immigration court or federal district court hearing fa-
miliar to American practitioners. Judgeships are career positions in the
Federal Republic. 0 Students who have recently completed their law
studies qualify for judgeships through their performance on two rigorous
state exams and their work during an internship in the judicial service.8 '
The Minister of Justice of the state selects the judges for the state, as-
signing the new judges to the lowest-ranked courts.8 2 Once appointed,
judges generally have positions for life and can be dismissed, transferred,
or involuntarily retired only in exceptional circumstances.8 3 The judges
are independent of the administrative branch of government, and see
themselves as a check on government administrators.8 4 They do, how-
ever, advance based on the evaluation of senior judges; therefore, there is
a significant pressure toward conformity. 5
In theory, judges of the state administrative courts sit in panels of
76. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 158, T 37.
77. Klever Interview, supra note 60.
78. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 208 n. 87.
79. Klever Interview, supra note 60.
80. HORN, supra note 17, at 37.
81. Id. at 36.
82. Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 39.
84. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 207; but see Horn, supra note 18, at 39 (threat to judicial
independence).
85. HORN, supra note 17, at 39-40.
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five,86 but often a single judge will hear an asylum case.8 7 The court is
not bound by the record created below, but sits as an independent fact-
finder.88 The role of the attorney at the hearing is minimal. Rather than
the ritual direct examination and cross examination presented by the at-
torneys in an American courtroom, the German judges actively question
the asylum-seeker in a quest to determine the applicant's credibility and
the other facts of the case. 89
B. A Case Study
Describing one hearing in the Administrative Court in Hamburg may
provide a little of the flavor of the first German judicial proceeding an
asylum-seeker experiences.' The asylum-seeker was a young Iranian
man of military age; the Federal Refugee Office had rejected his claim of
persecution based on political opinion. Dr. Hohberger, Judge of the Ad-
ministrative Court, convened the hearing. The asylum-seeker and his at-
torney were present; no representative of the government appeared. A
translator was present. There were no witnesses, no other court person-
nel, and, no observers other than the author and the lawyer guiding her
through the courts. After preliminary introductions the judge, who obvi-
ously had read the Federal Refugee Office's decision, began questioning
the asylum-seeker about the details of his claim. She asked him several
series of questions establishing the locale of his family's home and his
initial troubles with the authorities. After perhaps ten minutes of ques-
tions and answers, the judge paused and switched on a tape recorder.
She dictated - in the first person and in a chronological narrative - the
asylum-seeker's story. After she finished dictating, she turned off the
tape recorder and launched into another series of questions, which the
applicant answered. Another pause, another dictation in narrative form,
and another round of questions. And so on. The judge built a very thor-
ough factual picture of the applicant's claim. Only rarely did the asy-
lum-seeker's attorney intervene. For example, only after the judge asked
the same question several times and seemed dissatisfied with the answers,
would the asylum-seeker's attorney interject. After exhausting her ques-
tions about the case, the judge asked if the asylum-seeker wished to add
anything. The attorney made a short statement on his behalf and the
hearing ended. The judge said she would render a decision later, after
considering information compiled by the court about conditions in Iran,
86. Id. at 33 (three career judges, two private citizens or "lay" judges).
87. AsylVfG § 31(1) (permitting one judge to hear cases that do not raise difficult legal and
factual issues or issues of fundamental legal significance). See infra text accompanying notes
90-91.
88. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 207.
89. See HORN, supra note 17, at 48.
90. The author attended this hearing on July 9, 1987.
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the factual record established in court, and the record compiled below by
the Federal Refugee Office.
The judge had studied and lived in the Middle East. She was ex-
tremely knowledgeable about the culture and the history of the region.
Because of her expertise, the court assigned many Iranian cases to her.
The judge observed that she examines applicants closely to determine the
geographical locale of their lives. She thought this enabled her to evalu-
ate better the specific incidents alleged by the asylum-seekers to have
triggered their fear of persecution. She seemed to search for details that
indicated that the asylum-seekers' beliefs or actions had likely come to
the attention of people who could and would threaten persecution.9"
The extensive knowledge of conditions in the asylum-seeker's country
that this judge possessed is not the norm in asylum cases. The Adminis-
trative Courts in the Federal Republic, on occasion, encourage judges
hearing asylum cases to develop an expertise in certain refugee-producing
countries and regions.92 The judges also place great emphasis on expert
opinion concerning conditions in distant countries. 93 This attempt to ed-
ucate the judges beyond the evidence in the record may lead to a greater
awareness by the judge of danger spots within a region, and of safe alter-
natives within his own country that might be available to an asylum-
seeker. Certainly, it means that the judge may have more tools with
which to evaluate the asylum-seeker's credibility than a judge who lacks
expertise about the refugee's homeland.
III. PERSECUTION BASED ON MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP
A. Introduction
During the 1980's the German courts issued thirteen opinions re-
sponding to applications for refugee status based on membership in a
particular social group. The cases subdivide into two rough categories:
(1) those whose social group is broadly defined; and (2) those whose so-
cial group is their immediate family.
1. The Immediate Family as a Social Group
The second category contains claims by wives that they will be perse-
cuted due to the political activity or opinion of their husbands. The law
of the Federal Republic requires every applicant for refugee status to
show that he or she will be personally persecuted. 94 There is no presump-
91. Conversation with Dr. Hohberger, Judge of the Administrative Court of Hamburg,
July 9, 1987.
92. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 208.
93. See supra text accompanying note 24.
94. There is a great debate as to the extent to which asylum-seekers must show objective,
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tion that the spouse of someone who is persecuted will also face persecu-
tion.95 Moreover, even if the agency or the courts conclude that a spouse
of a prominent political figure is likely to face persecution, they will dis-
tinguish between persecution based on the spouse's own political activity
and persecution based on the relationship to a political figure. The for-
mer qualifies as persecution based on political opinion; the latter does
not. Accordingly, the politically inactive spouse characterizes her situa-
tion as persecution based on membership in a particular social group.
Her family, in particular her marriage, comprises her social group.
It is not unusual for the spouse of a person granted asylum in the
Federal Republic to be denied refugee status. This result generally oc-
curs when the agency or the courts conclude that the spouse is unlikely
to face persecution in her homeland. The inability to prove persecution,
as opposed to the inability to show that persecution will be based on
membership in a particular social group, is often the stumbling block.
The denial of refugee status to spouses of individuals recognized by the
Federal Republic as refugees is less draconian than it seems. The refusal
to grant refugee status does not mean the government will deport the
unsuccessful applicant. Rather, as the spouse of an individual lawfully
residing in the Federal Republic, she will be eligible for an ordinary resi-
dence permit, which allows her to remain in the Federal Republic but
confers fewer benefits than refugee status.96
These spouse-of-political-opponent social group claims present an in-
teresting look at the application of the refugee definition in the Federal
Republic, and at the specific factors that assume importance in deciding
when a marriage is likely to lead to persecution. In terms of refugee law
in the United States, however, these decisions are of less significance to
American refugee advocates than the other social group cases. By stat-
ute, United States law recognizes that the spouse and children of an indi-
rather than subjective, grounds for their fear of persecution. See generally Nicolaus & Klever,
supra note 30, at 22. There is a consensus, however, that German law has interpreted persecu-
tion broadly, to encompass "violations of human dignity" as well as threats to life or liberty.
Id. at 21.
95. Bundesverfass ungsgericht (BVerfG), Beschluss vom 19.12.84 (# 2 BVR 1517/84)
[Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of December 19, 1984]; Bundesverwaltungsgericht
(BVerwG), Urteil vom 02.07.85 (# 9C 35.84), at 6 [Federal Administrative Court, Decision of
July 2, 1985]. In 1985 the Federal Administrative Court reiterated that there was no presump-
tion that the spouse of a victim of political persecution would also be persecuted. The Court
stated, though, that relationship to a victim of persecution is a significant factor in evaluating
an applicant's claimed fear of persecution. Id. at 6. The Federal Republic is unique among
European signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention in not automatically extending to mem-
bers of the immediate family of a recognized refugee all the rights of refugee status. Nicolaus
& Klever, supra note 30, at 22. In the Federal Republic this automatic status is afforded only
to family members of "quota" refugees, a small subset of refugees in the Federal Republic.
Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 160-161, 52.
96. See Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 161, 53. Klever Interview, supra note 60. See
generally Gusy, Das "grosse" und die "kleinen"Asyle [The "Large" and the "Small" Asylum],
4/1988 ZAR, Zeitschri fu'r Ausltnderrecht und Auslanderpolitik [J. oF ALIENS L. & POL'Y]
158, 159-60.
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vidual who qualifies as a refugee are also entitled to refugee status.97
Consequently, there is no need to examine or identify the basis of the
likely persecution of the spouse or children.
2. Broadly Defined Social Groups
The non-spouse social group cases present a wide variety of factual
settings. The asylum-seekers come from Poland, India, Ghana, Iran,
Uganda, Rumania, and the People's Republic of China. Most are men.
They claim persecution based on their economic activity, their sexual
orientation, their tribe, their social class, and their physical attributes. In
six out of nine cases the courts agreed with their claims that they were
likely to face persecution based on their membership in a particular so-
cial group.
B. Broadly Defined Social Group Cases
1. Polish Entrepeneurs - Approved
A recent reported social group opinion was issued by the Administra-
tive Court in Gelsenkirchen.9" The court reversed the negative decision
made by the Federal Refugee Office99 concerning an asylum-seeker from
Poland. The claimant and his wife, who fled Poland in 1980 at ages fifty-
five and fifty-three respectively, had run a private (not state-owned) fu-
neral home in Breslau. They told a tale of extortion, arrest, confiscation,
and harassment by government tax officials and militiamen.)I This pat-
tern persisted from 1955 on, intensified in 1966 when the government
opened a competing business in Breslau, and again in 1975 when they
lost their lease. It culminated in 1979 when the husband was arrested
97. Section 207(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1157(c)(2) pro-
vides in part:
A spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(l) (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)) of any
refugee who qualifies for admission under paragraph (1) shall, if not otherwise entitled
to admission under paragraph (1) and if not a person described in the second sentence
of section 101(a)(42), be entitled to the same admission status as such refugee if accom-
panying, or following to join, such refugee and if the spouse or child is admissible (ex-
cept as otherwise provided under paragraph (3)) as an immigrant under the Act.
Section 208(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1158(c), the relevant section
pertaining to asylum-seekers who present themselves at the borders or within the United
States, provides:
A spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1) (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)) of an alien
who is granted asylum under subsection (a) may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum
under such subsection, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or
following to join, such alien.
98. Judgment of March 29, 1985, No..17 k 10.343/83, Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen
[VGG].
99. For a description of the role of the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refu-
gees and the system of judicial review, see supra text accompanying notes 48-78.
100. Judgment of March 29, 1985, VGG at 3-5. The court found the claimants' testimony
credible as to these facts. Id. at 11.
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and charged with bribing government officials, and all their cash was
confiscated from their office and home. As a result of the 1979 events,
this couple, whose income had earlier dropped by fifty percent due to the
government's refusal to renew their license for burial services, lost both
their savings and their ability to earn a living from their business. Crimi-
nal proceedings were initiated against them for bribes extorted by gov-
ernment officials, more of their property was confiscated in January 1980,
and the husband suffered a heart attack that prevented him from working
at all. Concluding that there was no future at all for them in Poland,
they decided to go to the Federal Republic of Germany where two of
their daughters lived.' They requested passports, received them
promptly,"0 2 and left Poland.
In their asylum petition to the court, the applicants argued that Polish
government authorities had ruined them financially and had seriously
threatened their lives by literally depriving them of the means of exist-
ence. They asserted that this pattern of harassment by psychological,
financial, and legal methods occurred to others who tried to run their
own businesses. It amounted to persecution of people engaged in private
enterprises.' °3 Thus, they based their asylum application on claims of
persecution as members of the social group of entrepreneurs.
The government responded to the applicants' argument by emphasiz-
ing that the Polish regime officially frowned on private enterprise and
believed that businesses should be state-owned. 1' 4 Consequently, any
Pole running his own business, such as the applicants, would likely face
pressure and penalties from the government. The pressure and penalties
thus experienced would be due to their defiance of the official economic
101. Another daughter lived in Sweden, where these claimants first stopped en route to
Germany. Based on medical advice concerning the husband's heart condition, the claimants
remained in Sweden for seven months. Their stay in Sweden raised the issue of whether the
applicants had already found refuge in Sweden before they arrived in Germany, thus disquali-
fying them from the right to asylum in Germany. See AsylVfG § 2, (excluding from recogni-
tion as refugee those who, prior to entering Germany, had already found protection from
persecution); AsylVfG § 7(2) (asylum applications must be disregarded if obvious that appli-
cant already found protection elsewhere); see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. The
court ruled in their favor, reasoning that refugees with more than one asylum possibility, e.g.,
Sweden as well as Germany, could choose the asylum country they preferred, and that a short
stay in another country en route did not indicate they had in fact chosen as their place of
asylum the first country they entered. Judgment of March 29, VGG at 5, 7-9.
102. They received the passports in four weeks, without paying bribes. The passport office
official told them to make good use of the passports, which they interpreted as a warning to
leave Poland and not return. Judgment of March 29, 1985, VGG at 4.
103. See id. at 3-4. The asylum-seekers pointed out that many of their acquaintances who
had private businesses had been driven out of business; many had fled abroad. Id.
104. The Polish government's hostile attitude and harassing actions toward privately-
owned businesses in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, when the applicants lived and worked in
Breslau, were confirmed by information from the Federal Republic's Foreign Ministry. Id. at
12, 14. This attitude obviously differs drastically from that of the current Polish government,
formed in 1989 by Solidarity in coalition with the Communist Party, the Peasants' Party, and
the Democratic Party. Watershed in Warsaw, Economist, Aug. 19, 1989, at 33-34; see also
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
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system of the country, not due to membership in any particular social
group.'o5 With regard to the "means of existence" argument, the govern-
ment asserted that the applicants had only been deprived of earning their
livelihood from a private business.I°6 No evidence had been presented
that they were refused the right to earn a living in a state-owned enter-
prise. Furthermore, the government emphasized that the applicants re-
ceived a pension, thus undercutting their claim that they had been denied
the means of existence." 7 They received passports as soon as they re-
quested them in 1980, and had also obtained passports in 1979 for a trip
to the Federal Republic of Germany to visit family members.°"
In essence, the government argued that the background, habits, and
social status of the applicants did not trigger their persecution. Rather
their "anti-social" private enterprise was the trigger. The government
did not seriously contest that the asylum-seekers were persecuted, but
challenged the idea that they were persecuted merely for belonging to a
group. The government asserted that these individuals were not perse-
cuted for believing in private enterprise, for formerly having participated
in private enterprise, for being the children of entrepreneurs, or for so-
cializing with other entrepreneurs, but only for carrying on certain so-
cially disapproved acts."°
The court rejected the government's arguments. Finding the appli-
cants credible," 0 the court concluded that attempts by Polish officials to
ruin the applicants financially had succeeded in leaving them destitute.
The court stated that the husband's physical condition, which had been
brought on by official harassment, made it impossible for him to go out at
this point in his life and begin working as a salaried employee."' The
court also concluded that the wife, though not physically impaired, had
no viable options for earning a living. When the business was confis-
cated she was fifty-three years old, and her only skills were those devel-
oped while working in her husband's business for twenty-five years.
Having been harassed by the authorities for years, she could not expect
them to help her find a new job. In addition, she had to care for her sick
husband. In light of these circumstances, the court concluded it was un-
realistic to expect her to go out and search for a new job to support the
family." 2 The court dismissed the significance of the pension, pointing
out that it would only cover the barest essentials and, more significantly,
that the applicants would somehow have to survive a twelve to eighteen
105. See Judgment of March 29, 1985, VGG at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. They had visited the Federal Republic from September 8-29, 1979. Id. at 4.
109. See id. at 6.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 14-15.
112. Id. at 15-16.
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month delay before receiving the first payment. Examining the facts that
led to the applicants' financial situation, the court concluded that the
Polish authorities had ultimately attempted to deprive the applicants of
the ability to earn any living at all. This treatment, according to the
court, constituted persecution." 3
With regard to the passports, the court believed it obvious that the
Polish authorities, having ruined the applicants, now wanted to be rid of
them. The authorities could easily exile them via a "voluntary" depar-
ture because their children had already left Poland and established them-
selves elsewhere. "4 Thus, obtaining passports did not undercut the
applicants' persecution claim.
Turning to the basis for the persecution, the court noted that the appli-
cants had presented in great detail uncontradicted testimony, corrobo-
rated by documentary evidence, concerning the official attempts to drive
them out of business. The court emphasized that information from the
Federal Republic's Foreign Ministry further corroborated the applicants'
claim. The Foreign Ministry's opinion indicated that Polish authorities
made a practice of harassing and taxing private businesses, and that an
appeal to the authorities by those in private enterprise for assistance
against extortion attempts by local officials would likely have been
futile. 115
The court noted that historically, in analyzing the motive for the per-
secution suffered by applicants, persecution has been directed against
those who think and act differently from the authorities." 6 According to
the court, the planners of a socialized economy, such as existed in Po-
land, often view private enterprise as an alien element and attempt to
destroy it. In doing so, they frequently direct discriminatory actions
against those involved in private enterprise, allow corrupt officials to take
advantage of them, and do not attempt to protect the victims from crimi-
nal acts such as extortion and unwarranted confiscation of their means of
a livelihood."I7 The court concluded that exactly such a scenario existed
in the case at hand. The applicants and others like them had suffered
greatly. They had been targeted because their activity in establishing pri-
vate businesses showed them to be members of a group insufficiently con-
trolled by and disloyal to the regime. Thus, their persecution was due to
113. Id. at 16-17.
114. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 11-12, 18. Consequently, persecution by private citizens or low-level officials in
Breslau could be imputed to the Polish government, thus satisfying the refugee definition re-
quirement of persecution by the government or by groups the government is unable or unwill-
ing to control. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, [hereinafter Handbook] at 17, 65
(1979).
116. Judgment of March 29, 1985, VGG at 18.
117. See id. at 19.
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their membership in the particular social group comprised of owners of
private businesses. Accordingly, they fell within the refugee definition of
the 1951 Geneva Convention and were entitled to asylum in the Federal
Republic. 8
In reaching this conclusion the court focused on the systematic efforts
to root out from Polish society a defined group of people, who might be
described as the entrepreneurs or the petit bourgeoisie. The government
argued that the Polish authorities attempted to proscribe certain eco-
nomic activity that conflicted with the state-controlled economy, but did
not prevent people engaged in this proscribed activity from working in
the state-controlled economy, and did not discriminate against them
based on their background or beliefs so long as they refrained from carry-
ing on their private businesses.
The court did not directly address the government's attempt to distin-
guish between proscribed economic activity and social group. It ignored
this activity/background distinction, and emphasized the fact that simi-
larly situated individuals were persecuted. The court appeared to believe
that the fact of persecution was undisputed and did not analyze the basis
for finding that there had been persecution. Rather once the court deter-
mined that persecution of private business existed in Poland, it concluded
that this ill-treatment sufficiently triggered the protection extended to
those persecuted based on membership in a particular social group.
Many interpretations of what constitutes a "particular social group"
can be read into this opinion, but the court did not explain its reasoning.
This is unfortunate because the attempt to proscribe certain activity -
here private enterprise - raises the complex prosecution versus persecu-
tion issue familiar to refugee law. In a nutshell, individuals fleeing pun-
ishment for committing a criminal act generally do not qualify as
refugees. The ill-treatment they fear is deemed prosecution, not persecu-
tion."I9 Unless the particular criminal law is an illegitimate one, such as
a law proscribing religious education to children,12 or the accused is
subject to excessive punishment,'2 1 the individuals are deemed fugitives
from justice rather than refugees. There is no indication here that the
court recognized the prosecution versus persecution analogy that could
be made to the facts of this case. Perhaps this is because the court implic-
itly viewed the private business activity of the applicants as a fundamen-
tal right, which the Polish authorities could not legitimately deny.
Under this view the court could have perceived the applicants as mem-
bers of the social group exercising the fundamental right of owning one's
118. Id. at 19-20. For a description of the Federal Republic's laws on asylum, see supra
notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
119. Handbook, supra note 115, at 56.
120. Id. at 57.
121. Id.
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own business. Perhaps the court believed that so long as private busi-
nesses were not unlawful - during twenty-five years of openly owning
their own business the applicants faced only one arrest and that was
based on a bribery charge - the activity/background distinction was
irrelevant. If so, the court may have been impressed that one group of
apparently law-abiding people - the owners of private businesses - was
singled out and persecuted. Or perhaps the court, as its reference to his-
torical persecution of those who think and act differently suggests, sim-
ply viewed the discrimination suffered by these applicants as so similar to
traditional political persecution that the applicants warranted protection.
In any event, the court's reliance on "particular social group" in this case
indicates that the social group may be based on economic activity or ca-
reer goals rather than on social origins, habits, or background. More-
over, the court's lack of explanation of the appropriateness of applying
the "particular social group" term to this case leaves the door open for
future judicial development of this aspect of the refugee definition.
2. Indian Women's Rights Activists Who Marry Out of Caste - Denied
In 1985, the Administrative Court in Ansbach also decided a claim
involving persecution based on membership in a particular social
group. 122 On this occasion the court upheld the Federal Refugee Office's
denial of the claim. The applicant was an Indian woman who fled to
Germany in 1978 at the age of thirty-one.' 23 In India she had been an
active member of a women's rights organization, 124 one of whose goals
w'as overcoming the oppression of women caused by the caste system.
This goal was keenly sought by the applicant who had violated the caste
system by marrying a man of another (and lower) caste and had suffered
greatly for her marriage.' 25 The applicant had been disowned by her
family. She was defamed and threatened with death by stoning or fire.
On one occasion she and her small daughter were forced to escape from
physical attack by fleeing through the window of her house. Her family
offered no help or protection.
126
In 1978 the applicant took part in a conference of her women's rights
organization. 127 Protests against the conference erupted into riots and
attacks on the participants. After giving a speech at the conference, the
applicant was arrested by the police. Fearing for her life, she fled India
several days later.
122. Judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, No. AN 1269-XII/79, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach [VGA].
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. The women's rights organization, Nari Serek Sangh, had been founded in the
mid- 1960's. Id.
125. Id. She belonged to the Maratha caste; her husband belonged to the Mudiraj caste.
Id.
126. Id. The family disowned her. Id
127. Id. The conference took place in Patna in April 1978. Id.
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Expert testimony submitted to the court indicated that meetings of
women's rights organizations in India were often dangerous affairs.' 28
Police swinging riot sticks frequently ended demonstrations by the par-
ticipants, arresting women who had dared to become unruly. Conse-
quently, women attending these meetings had to anticipate violence and
arrest by the police, as well as threats by their families and neighbors.
Moreover, the expert testimony indicated that women who do not wait
for marriages arranged by their families, but rather choose to marry a
member of a lower caste are likely to face death threats, stoning, and
burning, particularly if they live in rural areas. They cannot expect to be
protected by the police, other authorities, or courts.
In examining the applicant's claim, the court found her representa-
tions credible in almost all details. 129 The court noted that at her hearing
she had answered all questions clearly and directly, and that her descrip-
tion of the social situation in India corresponded with that of the expert
opinion. With regard to the applicant's membership in a women's rights
organization, the court concluded that members of this group at times
had been subjected to insults, rejection, verbal attacks, and even physical
assaults. The court also credited reports of death threats and instances of
arson at the organization's offices. The court pointed out, however, that
it was undisputed that the applicant's organization was a legal one, that
its activities were lawful, and that the authorities had not forbidden the
1978 meeting.' 30 Further, the court stated that the applicant had ac-
knowledged that she had not violated any criminal laws in India."'3 In9
light of these facts, the court concluded that the applicant's arrest was
not a matter of concern, for surely she would not be convicted of crimi-
nal activity if she returned to India and defended herself against any out-
standing charges.
With regard to the applicant's marriage "out of caste," the court be-
lieved the woman's story of the social ostracism, the death threats, and
the physical attacks visited upon the applicant and her daughter. Indeed,
the court noted that the applicant's situation upon return to India would
likely be even worse than before she fled because her husband had de-
serted her in Germany. 32 Consequently, she would be unable to turn to
him or his family for even a small measure of help or security. The court
also noted that the applicant had no vocational skills or training. The
128. Id. at 3. The court sent a written inquiry to the expert, Dr. Gabriele Vensky, the India
correspondent for Die Zeit, the German news weekly. Dr. Vensky filed a written response to
the court's question. Id at 3-4 (summarizing Dr. Vensky's report). For further discussion of
the role of expert opinion in German courts, see supra notes 24, 25 and accompanying text.
129. Judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, VGA at 9. But see id. at 8 (where the court commented
that some of the claimant's assertions about the police may have been somewhat overstated).
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 8.
132. Id. at 10.
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money she had earned in the past through her women's rights organiza-
tion would be insufficient to support the applicant and her daughter.
33
Thus, the court said, if the applicant returned to India she would surely
face a precarious financial situation and considerable difficulties in ex-
isting at the most minimal level.
Nonetheless, the court denied this application for asylum in Germany.
The court appeared to agree that the applicant could properly be charac-
terized as a member of two social groups, the group of women belonging
to activist women's rights organizations and the group of women who
had married men of another caste. The court also appeared to agree that
the discrimination and assaults the applicant had suffered as a member of
these groups amounted to persecution. But, the court stated, this terrible
treatment occurred at the hands of portions of the population who dis-
agreed with the applicant regarding the position of women in society and
the importance of maintaining the caste system, and could not be attrib-
uted to the government.134 The court acknowledged that many police
and other authorities agree with the conservative social attitudes about
women and the caste system, and do not discourage those who protest
against women like the applicant. The court, however, stated that the
authorities have no duty to intervene unless the criminal laws are vio-
lated, and, for example, these women are assaulted or threatened with
physical attack. The court acknowledged that the police often fail to
protect the women from attack, but concluded that this lack of police
protection is more likely due to laziness, poor training, and corruption on
the part of the police rather than to any intent to discriminate against
members of women's rights organizations.35 The court stressed that the
applicant had offered no contrary evidence concerning the motives of the
police. Therefore, the court characterized the persecution as actions un-
dertaken by private individuals and refused to attribute it in any way to
the government. Instead, after acknowledging that the government au-
thorities failed to prevent and energetically combat assaults against mem-
bers of the particular social groups described in this case, the court
simply attributed the government inaction to inefficiency and misman-
agement.' 36 The court then rejected the applicant's claim because she
could not prove that the government inaction was due to the victim's
membership in a particular social group. 37
Comparing this decision to the prior one is illuminating. In both cases
there was some degree of harassment by private individuals, thus raising
133. Id.
134. The court here relies on the refugee definition requirement that the asylum-seeker
demonstrate persecution by the government or by groups the government is unwilling or un-
able to control. Handbook, supra note 115.
135. Judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, VGA at 11-12.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id.
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the issue of whether the objectionable treatment could be attributed to
the government. In the Polish case officials carried out most of the har-
assment, but they appeared to be low-level officials and militia men, and
the bribes they demanded might well have been an expression of personal
greed rather than of official policy. Nonetheless, the court stated that the
government's toleration of harassment by private individuals and of offi-
cial corruption at the expense of the private businessmen meant that this
persecution could be attributed to the government. In the Indian case
private individuals carried out almost all of the harassment, although the
police sometimes used excessive force against women's rights demonstra-
tors. The reluctance of the Indian police to protect women from private
attacks can be compared to the indifference of the Polish authorities to
acts of extortion against owners of private businesses. The lack of police
protection in India was rot deemed to constitute government complicity
in the persecution, however, whereas the lack of protection in Poland
was deemed evidence of government tolerance of persecution. Moreover,
the Ansbach court ignored the principle that severe ill-treatment by pri-
vate individuals constitutes persecution if the government tolerates that
activity or is unable or unwilling to protect the victims against the offen-
sive acts.' 3
Furthermore, in both cases the asylum-seekers had actually been ar-
rested by the police for activities connected with their particular social
groups. In both instances the authorities filed charges against the appli-
cants alleging violations of standard criminal laws. In the Polish case the
arrest was considered further evidence of government persecution,
whereas in the Indian case the court ignored the arrest as possible evi-
dence of government persecution and merely asserted that the applicant
had nothing to worry about because she had done nothing illegal.
In addition, both cases raised the issue of economic survival. The
courts viewed both applicants as victims of persecution and as members
of a persecuted social group, and acknowledged that the persecution that
had occurred had driven the victims to the brink of starvation. The des-
perate financial straits of the Polish applicants constituted further evi-
dence of persecution, however, whereas the precarious economic position
of the Indian applicant was an unfortunate fact of life. The court ignored
the role played by the past persecution of this married-out-of-caste wo-
man in pushing her to her desperate financial situation.
Perhaps one could attempt to distinguish the cases by the official gov-
ernment policies involved. Whereas the official Polish policy is against
private enterprise, 139 the official Indian policy favors equal rights for wo-
138. Handbook, supra note 115, 65.
139. With the advent of the new Solidarity government in September 1989, the Polish
government's attitude toward private enterprise has changed dramatically. N.Y. Times, supra
note 104; see also Watershed in Warsaw, supra note 104.
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men.'" Thus, one could more easily attribute government complicity in
the private harassment in the Polish case than in the Indian case. There
are two reasons why the stated official policy should not be dispositive,
however. First, many government practices differ from their govern-
ment's stated philosophy. If government proclamations in favor of fair
treatment can absolve governments of all persecution within their bor-
ders carried out by private citizens, protection of. victims of persecution
will be truly vitiated. Second, and more significant for this case, in
neither Poland nor India does the official government policy permit pri-
vate individuals or low-level officials to assault citizens who are not ac-
cused of criminal activity. As a consequence, if government inaction in
the face of repeated extortion constitutes persecution by the government,
so should government inaction in the face of repeated physical attacks.
Indeed, the court's reluctance to attribute serious and recurrent har-
assment to the government in the case from India contrasts so markedly
with the ease with which it imputes misconduct to the government from
Poland that one must suspect that other factors influenced the court's
decisions. Political bias and social bias come to mind. It may well be
that the German courts have prejudged the Polish government as bad
and the Indian government as good, and as a consequence interpret simi-
lar facts differently if they occur in Poland or in India. Additionally, or
alternatively, the courts may feel that Polish refugees are more desirable
- more similar to the German population in terms of culture, religion,
and education - than Indian refugees. Neither of these types of bias is
an acceptable element in applying the legal definition of refugee set forth
by the 1951 Geneva Convention. 4' Nor does the Constitution of the
Federal Republic limit its guarantee of asylum to people who look Euro-
pean and flee from Communist countries.' 42 Therefore, if these unstated
distinctions are in fact the basis for distinguishing between the two asy-
140. Judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, VGA at 11-12.
141. The 1951 Refugees Convention, supra note 1, attempts to protect refugees by requir-
ing the signatory nations to accord significant rights to those individuals within their borders
who satisfy the Convention definition of refugee. The Convention does not require that the
signatory nations grant asylum to individuals recognized as refugees. Moreover, many nations
that accept refugees for resettlement, such as Canada, France, and the United States, choose
among the millions of eligible individuals by giving preference to those who have linguistic,
cultural, or family ties with the country of resettlement. Thus, similarity of culture may play a
role in the resettlement process, but is a totally unwarranted factor to consider in the process
of deciding whether someone has indeed suffered or has a well-founded fear of suffering perse-
cution. Because a country does not have to grant asylum to a refugee, it is important, as a legal
matter, to distinguish between recognition of refugee status and the grant of asylum. Although
there is no res judicata effect to a decision recognizing an individual as a refugee within the
meaning of the Geneva Convention, as a practical matter someone recognized as a refugee has
a much better chance of resettlement elsewhere.
142. In the Federal Republic the distinction between refugee recognition and grant of asy-
lum, see id., is in practice less important because the Constitution actually guarantees asylum
to those persecuted for political reasons. See GG, supra note 28. The constitutional guarantee
has been interpreted to apply to people fleeing any country, no matter what color their skin or
what cultural background they possess.
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lum-seekers described above, they undermine the rule of law in the refu-
gee process.
3. Iranian Homosexuals: The Social Condemnation Test - Approved
In 1983 the Administrative Court in Wiesbaden reviewed a social
group claim with some resemblance to the marriage-out-of-caste case. 14 3
The applicant's sexual orientation was the central issue. The applicant
was a thirty-five year old man from Iran who had lived in the Federal
Republic from 1976 to 1978.14 He was back in Iran when the Shah was
overthrown. Shortly thereafter, he requested and received a passport
from the authorities in Teheran, and promptly went back to the Federal
Republic where he applied for asylum. 4 '
In his application he stated that he could not live in a theocratic state
such as Iran had become. Although he had been raised in the Islamic
tradition, he did not believe that religious precepts should be applied lit-
erally to society and feared that he would be imprisoned for ignoring
religious laws. In particular, he feared that as a homosexual he would be
punished and perhaps even executed.' 46
The applicant pointed out that the Iranian government had not inter-
fered with the his departure from Iran nor his return to Iran.'4 7 The
Federal Refugee Office used this as evidence that he had not faced perse-
cution in the past. Further, the applicant conceded that the regime did
not know he was a homosexual. 148 According to the Federal Refugee
Office, the applicant could conceal his homosexuality from the Iranian
government and live peacefully in Iran, avoiding persecution in the fu-
ture. Therefore, his fear of persecution was not well-founded, and his
claim for asylum should be denied. 49
The court resoundingly disagreed and reversed the Federal Refugee
Office's denial of asylum.' 50 First, the court said, it is undisputed that
homosexuals can be and are executed in Iran. The court cited press re-
ports of executions of homosexuals, quoted from the Koran, referred to
the applicability of Islamic law to the general population, and concluded
that there is systematic punishment of homosexuals in Iran. 5 ' Second,
the court found credible the applicant's claim that he had been a homo-
sexual for many years and rejected the view that the applicant may have
143. Judgment of Apr. 26, 1983, No. IV/I E 06244/81, Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden
[VGWl.
144. Id. at 3-4 (summarizing the facts).
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6-9.
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merely alleged homosexuality for purposes of obtaining asylum. 152 The
court noted that admission of homosexuality involves certain social
stigma.' Moreover, the applicant had had no assurance that such an
admission would yield a countervailing benefit in the asylum process be-
cause no decisions by any of the appellate courts had granted asylum
based on persecution against homosexuals.' 54 Third, the court objected
to the government's view that the applicant should be told simply to re-
frain from homosexual activity and live inconspicuously in Iran.'55 The
court stated that although conflicting theories about homosexuality exist,
there is general agreement that homosexuality is not a mere preference
that can be turned on or off at will.' 56 The court believed that telling a
homosexual asylum-seeker that he can avoid persecution by being careful
to live a hidden, inconspicuous life is as unacceptable as suggesting that
someone deny and hide his religious beliefs or try to change his skin
color. 157
Having concluded that homosexuals are severely persecuted in Iran
and that the applicant, as a homosexual, would likely face persecution
there, the court then analyzed whether homosexuals constitute a particu-
lar social group within the meaning of the Geneva Convention. 5 8 The
court declared that it is irrelevant if group members know each other or
are members of an organization. Rather, the court said that for purposes
of the Geneva Convention, the key to determining the existence of a par-
ticular social group is whether the general population views this collec-
tion of people as an unacceptable group. 159 Thus, according to the court,
it is useful to ask how an objective observer of society would assess the
treatment of the group."16 The court ruled that the society in Iran treats
homosexuals as an undesirable group. Based on the pejorative labels at-
tached to homosexuals, the prejudice expressed against them, and the
destructive treatment they are subject to in Iran and in many other socie-
ties, the court concluded that homosexuals constitute a particular social
group within the Geneva Convention. As such they are entitled to pro-
tection from persecution.' 6 ' The court added that in many cases it may
be difficult to decide whether the mistreatment of homosexuals consti-
tutes discrimination or rises to the level of persecution, but that this dis-
tinction was easy to make in Iran where homosexuals are "crushed like
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 14.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 13-14.
159. Id. at 13.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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vermin.""'
Beyond its impact on the applicant in this case and potentially on
many other Iranian asylum-seekers, this decision is a helpful addition to
the jurisprudence because it attempts to analyze the social group term
and to suggest ways of identifying other particular social groups. The
"objective observer" approach to "undesirable groups" brings a realistic
flexibility to the legal analysis. Persecution of newly emerging despised
social groups can be recognized under this approach, as well as persecu-
tion of individuals who comprise traditional social groups.
Had the courts applied this analysis in the two cases previously dis-
cussed, the courts might have reached different results. In the Indian
case, it appears clear that a significant portion of the general population
considers it unacceptable for women to marry men from lower castes.
These women are the targets of discrimination, persecution, and worse.
Whether the women know each other or not, they share a common lot
and suffer because of their common social characteristic. An objective
observer of Indian society would conclude that the population views
these women as an undesirable group.
In the Polish case the view the general population has of private entre-
preneurs is less clear. It is apparent, however, that the official view of
owners of private business is that they are an undesirable element in soci-
ety. Because the government has the power and desire to persecute this
unacceptable group, an objective observer of society would likely con-
sider that private business owners were an undesirable group.
4. Chinese Landowner - Approved
Issues involving family relationships and economic status figured in
the 1983 decision of the Administrative Court in Ansbach concerning the
asylum application of a young man who had fled the People's Republic of
China.163 The court reversed the Federal Refugee Office's negative deci-
sion and affirmed the applicant's right to asylum.' The applicant, born
in 1950, claimed that his family had been prosperous in pre-revolution-
162. Id. at 14. The court also asserted that whereas a government might have a legitimate
interest in criminalizing homosexual activity, the issue here was whether the Federal Republic
should send someone back to Iran to face execution for his homosexual tendencies. Id. at 10.
163. Judgment of March 29, 1983, No. AN 419-1/78 (XVI), Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[VGA].
164. Id. at 1. The procedural history of the case was somewhat unusual. The applicant
arrived by ship in the Federal Republic in December 1974. He left the ship in Hamburg.
After working for his meals at a Chinese restaurant for some time, he left Hamburg for Diissel-
dorf. Having run out of money, and with no working papers, he turned himself in to the
police. He filed an asylum application on February 11, 1975. On September 9, 1976, he was
granted refugee status. On November 24, 1976, the Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs,
see supra notes 26, 58-59 and accompanying text, lodged an objection, pointing out that the
asylum-seeker had produced no corroborative evidence whatsoever. On April 27, 1978, the
Federal Commissioner's objection prevailed and the Federal Refugee Office rejected the appli-
cant's claim for asylum. The asylum applicant then filed the current appeal in the Administra-
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ary China. 6 5 After the Revolution in 1949, their rice fields were seized
and they were harassed and persecuted as class enemies. Both of the
applicant's parents died before he was five; nevertheless, he was criticized
and discriminated against as the child of class enemies. After he had
finished his schooling at age eighteen, he worked on an agricultural col-
lective. He was criticized and on occasion beaten. At the age of twenty-
five he fled by foot to the coast and swam to Hong Kong. There he
worked on the docks for two months and eventually sailed on a ship that
landed in Hamburg.16 6
The court perceived credibility as the central issue of this case. The
court ruled that it was undisputed that the prosperous families who had
owned large land holdings prior to the Revolution had suffered persecu-
tion after 1949, and that children of these families continued to be targets
of harassment. Consequently, the court concluded that there was perse-
cution of members of the social group of prosperous landowners.16 7 The
legal issues were not in dispute. Rather, the contested issue was a factual
one: did the applicant in fact belong to this particular social group?
The government argued that the applicant was not a member of the
large landholding class, and emphasized that he had presented no evi-
dence at all to corroborate his story. The government also asserted that
there was no evidence that the applicant feared persecution in 1975 when
he fled and that any punishment he suffered for his flight could legiti-
mately be characterized as prosecution.16 a Indeed, the evidentiary sup-
port for the asylum claim was skimpy. There was no evidence other than
the applicant's own testimony to show that he had even been born in the
People's Republic of China.'6 9 Nonetheless, the court noted that the ap-
plicant had recounted his experience in great detail and that his story
corresponded to other reports of similar persecution and flight. 70 In the
light of this correspondence, the evidence from other sources concerning
tive Court of Wiesbaden, asking the court to rescind the April 1978 decision of the Federal
Refugee Office. Judgment of March 29, 1983, VGA at 3-6.
165. Id. at 7. Other than his own testimony, the applicant had no evidence at all to cor-
roborate his story or even to prove that he had come from the People's Republic of China.
There were certain gaps in his description of his life in and flight from China, but the court
found his testimony credible. Id. at 8-9. See also id. at 2-5 (summary of facts).
166. Id. at 4. There was contradictory testimony as to whether the applicant had been a
stowaway aboard this ship. The court believed the applicant's assertion that he had not stowed
away, and discounted the contradictions as errors in translation. Id.
167. Id. at 7-8.
168. Id. at 8-9. Based on information received from the Foreign Ministry of the Federal
Republic, the court believed that illegal departure violated § 176 of the Criminal Code of the
People's Republic of China and was punishable by a maximum prison term of one year. Id. at
9.
169. Id. at 7. Noting that there was no corroborative evidence concerning his homeland,
the court accepted that the interpreter could help to verify that the applicant was from the
Province of Canton. Id.
170. Id. at 7-8. The court appeared to conclude that the applicant's story was truthful
because it was similar to the stories told by so many others. This, of course, is not the only
conclusion that can be drawn from the similarity. The court could have concluded that the
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persecution in China of children of formerly wealthy families, and the
lack of any evidence that cast doubt on the applicant's credibility, the
court declared that he had presented sufficient proof to establish his right
to asylum in the Federal Republic.' 71
The court quickly disposed of the government's other two arguments.
In response to the contention that the applicant may have faced mistreat-
ment in earlier times but not in 1975 when he left China, the court char-
acterized the applicant's life from 1968 to 1975 as years of
mistreatment. 172 The court noted that the applicant had long ago de-
cided to flee because he found his life unbearable. By the 1968 to 1975
period, he simply expected discriminatory treatment. His resignation to
low-intensity harassment did not mean that persecution had ceased.'
73
Moreover, the court stated, it was unnecessary to decide precisely what
mistreatment the applicant had suffered after he left school in 1968, be-
cause his illegal departure itself gave rise to a new ground of political
persecution. 
74
By crossing the border and leaving China without permission, the ap-
plicant had violated a criminal law with a potential penalty of one year
imprisonment.7 5 Although this is a fairly mild punishment, the court
stated that this punishment is political in nature and, therefore, consti-
tutes persecution, not prosecution. 176 Because the law was not merely a
measure to keep order but rather an attempt to force people to stay and
live under a political system with which they disagreed, the court con-
cluded that this law has a political aim.177 In addition, the court noted
that people convicted of illegal departure are sent to a re-education
camp, 178 demonstrating that the government's objective is political rather
than penal. The mildness of the penalty does not change its political
nature, according to the court.' 79 Nor was the court influenced by the
fact that the law regarding illegal departure had become effective after
the applicant had left the People's Republic. 80 The possibility of punish-
ment under the law existed.
applicant's claim was invented out of whole cloth based on the standard prosecution story. Id.
at 8.
171. Id. at 7-9.
172. Id. at 8-9. The court gives a detailed discussion of the applicant's years of mistreat-
ment, which triggered his decision to flee. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 9-10.
175. Id.
176. The jurisprudence in the Federal Republic regarding Republikflucht [illegal depar-
ture] is extensive. Criminal prosecution for leaving one's homeland without authorization is
deemed persecution based on a political conviction. Asylum in Europe, supra note 7, at 156-
157, 26. See generally R. MARX, Asylrecht [ASYLUM LAW] § 87 (4th ed. 1984) (containing
extensive annotations of judicial opinions concerning Republikflucht).
177. Judgment of March 29, 1983, VGA at 9-10.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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As the summary of the opinion indicates, the court credited all of the
applicant's factual assertions and legal arguments. The court was not
disturbed by the lack of corroborative evidence of even the most basic
facts. Moreover, the court credited the applicant's story because it was
similar to reports of persecution and flight made by other Chinese asy-
lum-seekers. Although the applicant's testimony may have been truth-
ful, it is easy to imagine a more skeptical court discounting a totally
unverified account that corresponds to the known persecution and flight
pattern as a tale created for the asylum process. Instead, the Ansbach
court accepted the applicant's claims at face value and required the gov-
ernment to produce evidence to disprove the applicant's claim. 8 1
Perhaps this generosity to the asylum-seeker was due in part to the fact
that his claim of persecution based on his family's former prosperity re-
counts an experience often observed in post-revolutionary societies.
Thus, the court was familiar with this type of claim and recognized the
impact that family membership in an overthrown class was likely to
have. Perhaps the court's lack of skepticism was due in part to the fact
that the applicant had fled a communist country, and thus benefitted
from a presumption of persecution.182 The court did not mention either
consideration, but the friendly reception it gave this applicant's claim
contrasted strongly with the reception received by asylum applicants
from non-communist countries such as India.'83 At the very least, this
decision demonstrates that applicants relying on persecution based on
membership in a particular social group receive a favorable review if
their social group is class-based.
5. Rumanian Landowners with Emmigri Family Members - Approved
Family membership and economic status again played a role in the
1982 decision of the Administrative Court of the Saarland reviewing a
social group claim presented by an asylum-seeker from Rumania. 8 4 The
applicant, born in 1914, came from a prosperous family. Her father was
the deputy director of the National Bank, her husband was a doctor in
the royal army. After the revolution, the government not only confis-
cated her parents' land and houses, but it discharged her husband from
the army, and sent him to the countryside where there was a shortage of
doctors.'8 5 Her husband died in 1970. In 1976, her son emigrated to
Israel with his wife, who was of Jewish descent. After her son and
daughter-in-law's criticism of the persecution they had suffered in Ruma-
181. See id at 6-7.
182. See supra notes 27, 139-41 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 122-142 and accompanying text.
184. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1982, No. 10 K 115/80, Verwaltungsgericht Saarland [VGS].
185. Id. at 3.
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nia was broadcast on Radio Free Europe,"8 6 the Rumanian authorities
made the applicant's life very difficult. State security agents interrogated
her, often at night. They mistreated her and demanded that she force her
son to keep silent in the future. They threatened to put her into a psychi-
atric hospital if she did not prevail upon her son. They took away her
four-room apartment and assigned her to one room. They organized her
neighbors and acquaintances into so vicious a harassment campaign
against her that she almost had a nervous breakdown." 7 In 1977 she
decided that life in Rumania was unbearable, but the authorities repeat-
edly denied her requests to leave. Finally, after paying a bribe, 8 she got
a passport in 1979, and went to the Federal Republic."8 9
The applicant explicitly argued that she had been persecuted as a
member of the particular social group comprised of wealthy landowning
families.' 90 She asserted that the authorities perceived this group as po-
litically unreliable and treated members of the group as suspicious char-
acters. In addition, the applicant based her asylum claim on the
persecution she had suffered as a member of the family of someone who
had been publicly critical of Rumania. Although one might characterize
this claim as persecution based on the political opinion of her son,'' it is
possible to view it as persecution based on family relationship. So
viewed, the family would constitute the particular social group.
The Federal Refugee Office credited the allegations the applicant
made, but concluded that she had not established a right to asylum.
92
With regard to the confiscation of her father's property and the dismissal
of her husband, the agency stated that these measures had only indirectly
affected the applicant. 193 With regard to the interrogations and other
mistreatment she received after her son's public criticism of Rumania,
the agency ruled that these were not sufficiently severe to constitute per-
secution. 94 With regard to the difficulties of obtaining permission to
leave, the agency asserted that the applicant should have no fear of pun-
ishment if she returned to Rumania because she had left with a valid
passport and exit permission.191
186. This criticism was also published in an American newsweekly, which the court did
not identify. Id. at 3-4.
187. Id. at 4.
188. She paid more than 10,000 Leu as a bribe. Id. at 4. In October 1989, the exchange
rate was 8.695 Leu for $1 (U.S.). Telephone Interview with Ingalill Carlson, New York For-
eign Exchange, (Oct. 6, 1989).
189. She left Rumania on June 30, 1979, and flew directly to the Federal Republic. She
filed a written application for asylum on July 18, 1979. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1982, VGS at 3.
190. The court refers to her membership in the wealthy propertied class Grossbtirgertum.
Id. at 6.
191. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
192. Judgment of Dec. 10, 1982, VGS at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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In reversing the Federal Refugee Office's negative decision, the court
noted that the applicant had suffered repressive measures far in excess of
the normal treatment accorded the general population in Rumania. The
court ruled that this mistreatment was sufficiently severe and injurious to
constitute persecution. 196 Further, the court was not convinced that the
applicant's use of a passport procured through bribery to leave Rumania
would enable her to escape prosecution under the Rumanian criminal
laws regarding unlawful departure.1 97 In addition, the court stated that
by filing an asylum request, the applicant was liable for criminal prosecu-
tion in Rumania for slandering the state."98 Accordingly, based on all
these considerations, the court concluded that the applicant had a well-
founded fear of persecution if she returned to Rumania.
Unfortunately, the court focused solely on the likelihood of persecu-
tion and not on the basis for the persecution. It lumped all the claims
together - the past mistreatment, the potential criminal prosecutions for
illegal departure and for filing an asylum request - and concluded that
the applicant was entitled to asylum. The court did not analyze either
the landowning class social group claim or the family-of-emigr6 social
group claim. Nor did it analyze the political opinion claim inherent in
prosecutions for unlawful departure and for slandering the state. Neces-
sarily, the court must have concluded that the applicant had a well-
founded fear of persecution based on social group or political opinion or
a combination of the two, but the opinion does not disclose the court's
reasoning.' 99
Viewed in light of the analysis proffered by the Wiesbaden court in the
case of the homosexual asylum-seeker from Iran, both the Chinese and
the Rumanian cases appear to qualify as persecution based on member-
ship in a particular social group. In both cases the pertinent social group
is a class-based one: pre-revolutionary prosperous landowners. In both
cases the evidence demonstrated that the children of the former landed
gentry received rough treatment directly due to their family heritage. In
both cases the evidence indicated that an objective observer would con-
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id. at 10-11. The court therefore considered the issue of illegal departure [Republik-
flucht], discussed supra note 180, and examined the text of the pertinent criminal laws of
Rumania. Id.
198. Id. at 11. Whether the filing of an application for asylum in itself is a sufficient post-
flight basis for persecution is a topic frequently addressed by the German courts. See generally
Marx, supra note 180, § 70 (extensive annotations concerning post-flight grounds [Nachflucht-
grtinde] for asylum, of which applications for asylum [Beantragung von Asyirecht] comprise a
large subset). The Saar court examined the Rumanian laws criminalizing "slander of state
organs" that might be applied to the applicant, and relied on Foreign Ministry information
concerning the likelihood of prosecution under these statutes in concluding that the applicant
would likely be punished in Rumania for filing an asylum claim in Germany. Id.
199. Possibly, the persecution of the applicant could be described as religious in nature, in
that her daughter-in-law was Jewish and had emigrated to Israel. The court did not mention
persecution based on religion.
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clude that powerful segments of society viewed the children of landown-
ing families as class enemies. In both cases the persecution of a social
group led members of that group to take actions in defiance of the re-
gime, thus resulting in persecution based on political opinion as well as
based on membership in the social group.
6. Selected Corrupt Government Ghanaian Officials - Denied: The
Homogeniety and Inner Structure Tests
Although economic activity and relative prosperity were important in
the Chinese and Rumanian cases, these factors in themselves are not suf-
ficient to constitute a social group according to the Administrative Court
of Hannover. In 1984 the court issued a lengthy opinion sustaining the
Federal Refugee Office's denial of asylum to a former government official
from Ghana.2" The applicant, a low-level official dealing with agricul-
ture, had acted in conjunction with his supervisor to sell government-
owned fertilizer to farmers at inflated prices.2"' After complaints from
farmers the police arrested him, but his supervisor intervened and man-
aged to get him released after three days in jail.2"2 Approximately one
month later a coup occurred.20 3 Within days it appeared that officials of
the prior government were being investigated; the applicant fled to Togo
and then to the Federal Republic.2"
In his application the asylum-seeker emphasized that the new regime
explicitly vowed to wage a "holy war" against government corruption
20 5
and had established special tribunals to exercise "revolutionary jus-
tice."2 6 He claimed that the government had categorized as enemies of
the regime corrupt officials, the particular social group to which the ap-
plicant belonged. He asserted that the government of Ghana mistreated
and even tortured prisoners deemed enemies of the regime, and applied
the death penalty to corruption cases. Thus, sending him back to Ghana
was sending him to certain death.20 7
200. Judgment of June 6, 1984, No. 1 OVGA 91/82 As, Verwaltungsgericht Hannover
[VGH].
201. The court had serious doubts about the applicant's credibility. Id. at 6-7. However,
the court did not specify which aspects of his testimony it believed and which aspects it did not
believe. In terms of the legal analysis, the court proceeded as if the applicant's assertions were
true, and concluded that nonetheless he did not qualify as a refugee. Id. at 3-5.
202. After being reported to the police on May 10, 1979, the applicant spent three days in
jail. Id. at 3.
203. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the current leader of Ghana, first came to power in
a coup on June 4, 1979. See id. at 3. Rawlings remained in power for three months after the
1979 coup. He returned to power in a coup on December 31, 1981. See id. at 113. He has
remained in power since that time. 1990 WORLD ALMANAC.
204. The applicant arrived in the Federal Republic as a stowaway on a ship, on September
20, 1979, approximately three and one-half months after the coup. Judgment of June 6, 1984,
VGH at 3-4.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 3.
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At first blush, describing corrupt government officials as a particular
social group seems a desperate and brazen assertion. This case bears
closer examination, however. The applicant did not argue that prosecu-
tion of criminals in general constitutes persecution nor argue that
criminals prosecuted and punished for violating the penal laws are suffi-
ciently similar to one another that they can be classified as a particular
social group that needs protection from persecution. Rather he argued
that the government had selected a relatively harmless group of offend-
ers, denied them proper legal proceedings, and subjected them to dispro-
portionate penalties. He asserted that the government took this action
for political reasons. The applicant conceded that corrupt government
activity is illegal and deserves to be punished, but claimed that the dis-
proportionality of the punishment revealed that the goal of the govern-
ment is political, not penal. In essence, he argued that the irregular
judicial proceedings and the application of the death penalty to economic
crimes, which in the past had not been treated harshly, undermine the
view that the Ghanaian government is merely prosecuting rather than
persecuting individuals.2 °8 He further argued that the government had
targeted a fairly small group of people for this persecution. This group
consisted of officials who had served the former government, who were
educated, and had through their positions committed non-violent, eco-
nomic crimes.2° 9
With regard to the social group claim, the court was skeptical. The
court stated that to qualify as a particular social group within the mean-
ing of the Geneva Convention refugee definition, an array of individuals
needed both a certain degree of homogeneity and some degree of inner
structure.2 '0 The court doubted that individuals whose similarity to each
other was only that they had committed economic crimes satisfied either
element. 21  The court did, however, expressly state that in certain cir-
cumstances a group of criminal offenders could constitute a particular
social group for purposes of the refugee definition. If the government
selected a group of comparatively insignificant and harmless law-break-
ers, treated them in a flagrantly illegal manner, and subjected them to
greatly disproportionate punishment in order to divert the citizenry's
hostility from the government to this scapegoated group, then one could
say that certain criminals were being persecuted as members of a particu-
lar social group.212
After setting forth these conditions in which criminals could be
deemed members of a particular social group, the court determined that
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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officials accused of public corruption in Ghana did not constitute such a
group. The infrequent imposition of the death penalty indicated that
corrupt officials did not suffer greatly disproportionate punishment.
2 13
The judicial process accorded these defendants, though summary, was
not flagrantly illegal.2 4 The criminal offense at issue was not insignifi-
cant and harmless.2 5 Thus, the corrupt officials classification failed on
all the indicia the court had outlined regarding the persecution of crimi-
nal offenders as a social group. Although the court examined at some
length the facts pertinent to viewing criminal offenders as a persecuted
social group, it did not explain further its initial comment that it was
necessary to prove homogeneity of members and an internal group struc-
ture in order to establish a particular social group within the meaning of
the Convention refugee definition.
The potential death penalty (the Federal Republic of Germany has
none) and the irregularities in the post-coup judicial system were two
aspects of the applicant's claim that appeared to trouble the court, how-
ever. In analyzing the capital punishment claim, the court relied on ex-
pert testimony. The court stated that the death penalty in Ghana was
imposed only rarely, only if the crime was particularly heinous, and only
if unanimously voted by the tribunal.216 Acknowledging that the poten-
tial punishment for corruption included the death penalty, the court con-
cluded that it was unlikely in any but the most extreme case.217 Noting
that Ghanaian asylum-seekers often overstate their cases and claim that
they face a death sentence for an insignificant economic crime, 218 the
court implied that was what this particular applicant had done. More-
over, the court recognized that meting out severe penalties for economic
crimes might help get a nation's economy back in order, in addition to
deterring criminal activity. 2 9 Thus, the court implied that even if the
applicant was a likely candidate for the death penalty, capital punish-
ment might be legitimate in his case.22°
The court discussed in much greater detail the modifications of the
judicial system since the 1979 coup.221 The court conceded that the judi-
cial system in Ghana had been under great attack in the early 1980's,
raising serious questions about its impartiality and independence.222
These excesses had now ceased, according to the court, and the judicial
213. Id. at 22.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 22.
217. Id. at 24-25.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 10-21.
222. Judges were beaten; a few courts were closed; three Supreme Court judges were mur-
dered; other Supreme Court judges fled the country. In the summer of 1983 a mob occupied
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system was no longer in disarray and under siege. 223 The system, how-
ever, had clearly changed since the coup. These changes included expe-
dited trials,22 admissibility of hearsay evidence, 225 defendant bore the
burden of proof,226 no guaranteed life tenure for judges, 22' and no right
to appeal.228 The court concluded that these changes in the legal tradi-
tion in Ghana did not delegitimize the modified system.229 According to
the court, some of the changes had corrected defects in the common law
tradition as compared to the civil law system.230 Even those changes that
were questionable did not prevent the new system from according trials
that meet the minimum standards of fairness.23'
Furthermore, the court emphasized, there was no evidence that the
new judicial system was established to attack members of a particular
social group.232 To the extent that the government's objective in creating
new tribunals was to root out corruption, the court concluded that this
was a legitimate goal, not persecution.233 Thus, in light of the basic fair-
ness of the legal system, the court ruled that the government's call for a
holy war on corruption, unhindered by legal technicalities, could be dis-
missed as mere rhetoric. 234
In sum, this case established that in certain circumstances the treat-
ment of criminal offenders may constitute persecution of a particular so-
cial group.235 The court concluded, however, that in the circumstances
present in Ghana in 1984, government officials prosecuted for corruption
did not constitute such a group. Furthermore, the court posed a two-
part analysis for social group claims: homogeneity and inner struc-
ture.236 By rejecting the refugee claim in this case the court implicitly
decided that corrupt government officials lacked the requisite degree of
inner structure and homogeneity to meet the social group definition.
7. Ugandan Member of Bagandan People - Approved
Although the Ghanaian official's claim foundered on the Hannover
court's two-part approach, the next two social group claims fit quite
the Supreme Court with the goal of abolishing the regular administration of justice. IM. at 11-
12.
223. Id. at 12.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 20.
226. Id. at 20-21.
227. See id. at 17-18.
228. Id. at 16-17.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id. at 10.
232. Id. at 16.
233. Id. at 9, 16.
234. Id. at 24-25.
235. See id. at 27.
236. Id. at 9.
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comfortably into that analysis. Both involved asylum-seekers from
Uganda.
In the earlier case, decided in 1983 by the Administrative Court in
Cologne, the court reversed the Federal Refugee Office's rejection of the
asylum claim.237 The applicant, a citizen of Uganda, arrived in the Fed-
eral Republic in late 1978 at the age of eighteen.238 He traveled on a
Ugandan passport that had been issued in 1974. Shortly after his arrival
he applied for asylum, listing three grounds on which his family had
been, and would continue to be, persecuted. His claim rested on mem-
bership in three social groups: the group comprised of large landowners,
the group of skilled professionals, and the Baganda group.239 His father,
an architect and prosperous landowner, was a member of the Baganda,
who largely live in the southern part of Uganda. 24° Because the Baganda
in general opposed the government led by Idi Amin, they were often per-
secuted. 241' The applicant testified that his father's land had been confis-
cated by the Amin regime. His house had been ransacked. The father
went into hiding and later disappeared, likely murdered by the govern-
ment. Friends of his father sent the applicant to live in the frontier terri-
tory; from there he was sent to the Federal Republic to join his sister in
Bonn.
2 4 2
In early 1979, after the applicant had arrived in Germany, Idi Amin
was overthrown. 24 3 Based on the changed circumstances in Uganda, the
Federal Refugee Office rejected the applicant's request for asylum. 24
The applicant promptly challenged the decision in court, alleging the
same three social group grounds. In addition, he submitted reports that
the Baganda were suffering terribly under Obote, Amin's successor.
2 45
The government argued that the applicant had not proven that he him-
self would be persecuted, and pointed out that previous judicial decisions
had concluded that membership in the Baganda people in itself is an in-
237. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1983, No. 15 k 15316/80, Verwaltungsgericht Ko"n [VGK].
238. Id. at 2-3 (summary of the facts).
239. Id. at 2.
240. Id. at 6.
241. The Baganda number approximately three million; they comprise one quarter of the
population of Uganda. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, at A3, col. 5. Historically, they have been
the dominant group. Id. The Baganda also had well-established feudal kingdoms. Wash. Post,
December 15, 1980, at A22. The Baganda people live in the southern part of Uganda. Id.
242. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1983, VGK at 2-3.
243. Tanzanian military forces overthrew Amin in April 1979. Wash. Post, April 12,
1979, at A16.
244. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1983, VGK at 3 (citing Judgment of Oct. 1, 1980, Bundesamtflir
die Anerkennung Auslandischer Flutchtlinge, (Federal Refugee Office)).
245. Apollo Milton Obote was a leading government figure in Uganda after independence
from Great Britain in 1962. First he was prime minister; he cancelled elections in 1967 and
named himself president. Idi Amin, his military chief of staff, overthrew Obote in 1971. After
Amin was deposed by Tanzanian troops in 1979, see supra note 243, Obote returned to Uganda
and campaigned for the presidency, which he won in a disputed election in December 1980.
Wash. Post, supra note 241; N.Y. Times, supra note 241. See further discussion infra note 253.
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sufficient basis for asylum. 246 Moreover, the government argued, the ap-
plicant did not need asylum in another country. He could ensure his
own safety by simply moving from the southern part of Uganda to an-
other region of the country.
247
In response to the government's first argument, the court acknowl-
edged that a grant of asylum must be predicated on a threat of persecu-
tion to the individual applicant.248 If, however, it is clear that a
particular social group is persecuted, then an applicant need only prove
membership in that social group.249 The fact that the social group is a
target means that individual members of the group are in jeopardy.
Thus, based on their group identity, individuals have a well-founded fear
of persecution to themselves.2"' To rule otherwise, said the court, would
require each member of a group targeted for persecution to remain in his
homeland and expose himself to the persecution.25" '
There was no doubt, according to the court, that the applicant was a
member of the Baganda people.252 Further, said the court, the evidence
indicated that the Baganda continued to suffer terribly under the Obote
regime. Obote and most of the army came from the northern part of
Uganda,253 a much poorer area than the southern region inhabited by the
Baganda.2 4  Guerilla activity was concentrated in the south.25 5 The
longstanding resentment of the prosperous Baganda by other Ugandans,
plus the military goal of eliminating the guerrillas made a murderous
combination, concluded the court.256 The army suspected the civilian
population of supporting the guerrillas; therefore, the army reacted by
arbitrarily imprisoning, torturing, and murdering members of the
246. Judgment of Apr. 7, 1983, VGK at 7-8.
247. Id. at 9. This is the so-called "internal flight" principle. An individual who has a
well-founded fear of persecution in one region of his homeland is not entitled to asylum in the
Federal Republic if he can live securely in some other part of his homeland.
248. Id. at 8.
249. Id. at 8-9.
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id. at 9.
252. Id. at 6.
253. Id. at 6-7. Apollo Milton Obote is the grandson of a chief of the Lango tribe in the
north. His followers are in the north; his opponents in the south, particularly the Baganda
region. Wash. Post, supra note 241. The rivalry between the two northern tribes that domi-
nated the Ugandan army, the Acholi and the Lango, led to the overthrow of Obote in July
1985 by Gen. Okello of the Acholi group. N.Y. Times, August 11, 1985, at ES, col. 1. Chris-
tian Science Monitor, July 30, 1985, at 15. Okello's government was deposed in January 1986
by Yoweri Museveni, a southerner. Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 1988, at 7.
Ironically, the army under President Museveni was later accused of being dominated by the
southern Baganda. Though generally considered well-disciplined, the post-1985 army is feared
by people in the north who supported the previous government. Christian Science Monitor,
January 26, 1987, at 10.
254. The Baganda have historically dominated Uganda. They bitterly opposed Obote's
efforts to destroy their feudal kingdoms. The Baganda seek to establish an independent mon-
archy. Wash. Post, supra note 241; N.Y. Times, supra note 253.
255. Judgment of Apr. 7, 1983, VGK at 6.
256. Id. at 6-7.
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Baganda group. 257 The soldiers also terrorized the Baganda because they
perceived the Baganda people to be enemies of the regime.25 18 The court
decided that this treatment occurred based on membership in the
Baganda people, and constituted persecution of a particular social
group.25
9
The court also dismissed the government's argument that the appli-
cant could be safe by simply moving to another region of Uganda.
2 ° If
the applicant were forced to live in other areas of Uganda, according to
the court, he would be unsafe because people would view him as a mem-
261ber of the "enemy" Baganda. Moreover, the army would likely press
him into service and force him to fight against the Baganda in the
south.26 2 As a result, his situation elsewhere in Uganda would be
untenable.
In sum, the court stated that the applicant must be granted asylum
because the evidence supported an affirmative answer to the two signifi-
cant factual questions presented by the case. Those questions were: (1)
Was the applicant a Baganda? (2) Did the Ugandan government perse-
cute the Baganda? The court accepted, without analysis, the assertion
that the Baganda constitute a particular social group within the meaning
of the Geneva Convention.26 3 Such a conclusion was essential to the
court's reasoning, much of which focused on the mistreatment individu-
als had received merely because they belonged to the Baganda people.
The fact that the Baganda are a well-known African group with a specific
group identity and a complex internal structure undoubtedly influenced
the court.2 64 This asserted social group was not a conglomeration of
strangers accused of violating a legitimate law, but a cohesive group with
a common ethnic heritage.
8. Ugandan Member of Bagandan People I] - Approved
Later in 1983, the Administrative Court in Ansbach reached a similar
conclusion about another asylum-seeker from Uganda.26 5 This appli-
cant, also a Baganda, was twenty-nine years old in 1977 when he came to
the Federal Republic and claimed asylum.2 66 He alleged that he feared
257. Id.
258. Id. at 7.
259. Id. at 8.
260. Id. at 9.
261. Id. at 10.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 8.
264. Historically a strong group, the Baganda society included a well-developed system of
feudal kingdoms. See supra note 241.
265. Judgment of Nov. 29,1983, No. AN 185 XIII/79 (XIX), VerwaltungsgerichtAnsbach
[VGA].
266. Id. at 2-3 (summary of facts).
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persecution on religious, political, and social group grounds.26 7 He was
Protestant; he had been involved in political demonstrations; he was a
member of the Baganda people. 26' The applicant stated that from 1970
to 1975 he had studied in Hungary, where his refusal to take courses in
Marxism and Leninism created difficulties. After returning to Uganda in
1975 he began medical studies, but was arrested and jailed for several
weeks for participating in a student demonstration. Shortly thereafter,
he left Uganda by foot for Kenya. He resorted to a bribe to get a pass-
port and visa and after a year in Kenya he managed to fly to Germany.26 9
The applicant also alleged that his family had been persecuted by the
Amin regime. He said that while he was in Hungary his father had been
murdered, his uncle and brother-in-law had been executed, another uncle
had been abducted, his mother had been placed under house arrest, and
four of his siblings had fled the country after protesting their father's
death.2 7 ° He attributed these events to the Amin regime's resentment of
and violence against the Baganda.
The Federal Refugee Office rejected the applicant's request for asy-
lum.27 1 Noting that there were inconsistencies in his statements concern-
ing his own arrest and his father's death, the agency concluded that the
applicant was not credible.27 2 Furthermore, the government noted that
although information from the Federal Republic's Foreign Ministry con-
firmed that the Ugandan army terrorized the civilian population, the
Foreign Ministry attributed this to lack of training, discipline, and pay
rather than to any particular animosity toward the Baganda. 27 3 The For-
eign Ministry explained the high incidence of terror among the Baganda
to the coincidence that the army happened to be concentrated where the
Baganda live. 274
The court acknowledged that the applicant had made contradictory
and unsubstantiated allegations.27 5 Moreover, because the Amin regime
had fallen from power in the interim between the filing of the claim and
judicial review of the agency's decision, the court held that the changed
political conditions meant there was no longer a basis for many of the
267. Id. at 2-4.
268. He alleged that Idi Amin, who was Moslem, persecuted members of other religions.
Id. at 2. Amin's violence toward the Christian majority in Uganda was well known. Wash.
Post, February 27, 1977, at A14.
269. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1983, VGA at 3.
270. Id at 2-3.
271. Id. at 4.
272. Id
273. Id. at 9. In 1984 the State Department of the United States reported that the
Ugandan army was underfed, underpaid, undisciplined, and in desperate need of military
training assistance. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1984, at A2, col. 3.
274. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1983, VGA at 9.
275. Id. at 5-6.
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fears the applicant had expressed. 27 6 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the applicant still had a well-founded fear of persecution. 277 Despite
reservations about the applicant's credibility in general, the court had no
doubt that he was a member of the Baganda people.278 The court also
believed that the historical record of enmity between the Baganda and
other people in Uganda was clear.2 79 Turning to current events, the court
found that the Baganda in general were known to oppose the Obote gov-
ernment, which replaced that of Idi Amin. 280 The court also found cred-
ible the reports of a campaign of terror by the army against the
Baganda. 28  Without expressly disagreeing with the Foreign Ministry's
view, the court concluded that the current Ugandan government contin-
ued to persecute the Baganda.282 The court agreed with the Foreign
Ministry that some members of the Baganda people might escape perse-
cution. But, the court stressed, members of the Baganda group definitely
faced heightened risks of danger.28 3 Thus, their fears of persecution were
well-founded. Accordingly, the applicant, as a member of the Baganda
people, had a right to asylum in the Federal Republic. 284
As had the Cologne court, the Ansbach court accepted without discus-
sion the assertion that the Baganda constitute a particular social group
for purposes of the Convention refugee definition. Again, the sense that
the Baganda people are a cohesive group with a complex internal struc-
ture and are perceived by the general population in Uganda as a specific
social group bolstered the court's conclusion.
Although this holding may seem intuitively correct, it is interesting to
observe, nonetheless, the ease with which the court overlooked the For-
eign Ministry's evidence that army terror was due to lack of training and
discipline rather than to hostility to the Baganda people. Similar evi-
dence about the lack of training, efficiency, and pay of the Indian police,
which led to their inability or unwillingness to protect women who marry
276. Id. Idi Amin was overthrown in April 1979. See Judgment of Apr. 7, 1983, VGK at
3 and supra notes 245, 253.
277. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1983, VGA at 10.
278. The court considered the following evidence important: the applicant had always
asserted that he was a member of the Baganda people; he alleged he was born in the Baganda
region and accurately located this birthplace on an unmarked map; he spoke Luganda, the
language of the Baganda people. Id. at 6-7.
279. The court described the "divide and conquer" British colonial tactics in Africa, and
noted that under British rule the Baganda became the most advanced of the neighboring peo-
ples. Id. at 7. The Baganda are the largest group in Uganda and historically have been the
most dominant Ugandan people. N.Y. Times, supra note 241.
280. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1983, VGA. The Baganda strenuously opposed Obote in his
first presidency prior to his overthrow by Amin because he tried to crush the power of the
Baganda feudal kings. Wash. Post, supra note 241.
281. The court's reference to the Obote regime's indiscriminate terror perhaps is a clue
that the court was reluctant to return the applicant to Uganda because the situation in Uganda
was so threatening. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1983, VGA at 10-11.
282. Id. at 7-8.
283. Id. at 9.
284. Id. at 10.
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out of caste or who demonstrate for women's rights, compelled another
court to conclude that persecution could not be attributed to the victims'
membership in a social group.
9. Sports Figures and Tattooed People - Denied
The last social group case in the non-spouse category contains claims
that sports figures, people who have been tattooed, and family members
constitute particular social groups. For reasons having to do with the
applicant's credibility, rather than the three asserted, the Administrative
Court in Kassel upheld the Federal Refugee Office's rejection of the Ira-
nian asylum-seeker's claim.2"' Coincidentally, this applicant was also an
admitted criminal, who committed these crimes not in Iran, but in West
Germany, where he had received a substantial prison term due to multi-
ple violations of the narcotics laws.28 6 He did not claim that his criminal
status was relevant to his request for asylum. Precisely which social
group or groups he believed pertinent to his claim was unclear.28 7 He
alleged that he was likely to be persecuted in Iran because he had been
tattooed, because he was a prominent sports figure who was rejecting his
homeland, and because members of his family had been persecuted in
Iran.2 s8 Indeed, two of his brothers had already been granted asylum in
the Federal Republic.28 9
Emphasizing that the applicant's statements contained many inconsis-
tencies, that he had changed the basis for his asylum claim three times, 290
that the timing of his recent application for asylum happened to coincide
with the entry of a deportation order against him, 291 and that some of his
assertions were inherently unbelievable,29 2 the court concluded that this
285. Judgment of Aug. 16, 1984, No. IV/IE 08726/83, Verwaltungsgericht Kassel
[VGK].
286. Id. at 3.
287. In addition to social group-based persecution, he also claimed he would be persecuted
in Iran on religious grounds because he was not Islamic, on political grounds because he had
criticized Khomeini to fellow Iranians imprisoned with him in Germany, and on political
grounds because he had filed an asylum request and thus had been disloyal to the regime. Id.
at 3, 6, 8-9. Four years earlier, in 1977, he had filed an asylum request based on his political
activities against the Shah. That application was rejected in 1980 after the Shah was deposed.
Id. (citing Federal Refugee Office decision of July 14, 1980).
288. Id. at 3-4.
289. Id. at 3.
290. The applicant first claimed asylum based on his active resistance to the Shah. After
the downfall of the Shah led to the rejection of his asylum claim on July 14, 1980, he filed a
new asylum application stating that he feared persecution by the Khomeini government be-
cause he was not a Moslem. His second application was denied on September 30, 1983, based
on the contradictions and lack of credibility in his allegations. His third asylum application
again changed grounds to allege fear of persecution based on his tattoos, his prominence as a
sports figure, and his relationship to two brothers granted asylum in the Federal Republic. Id.
at 7.
291. Id.
292. For example, the applicant stated that he feared persecution based on his political
opinion because his fellow Iranian prisoners would make it known that he had spoken against
the Khomeini regime while he was in prison in Germany. He said that he had criticized the
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asylum-seeker was not credible.
It is clear from other judicial decisions that members of a family can
constitute a particular social group for purposes of the refugee defini-
tion.29 3 In terms of the Hannover court's analysis, 294 members of a fam-
ily tend to be homogeneous, in comparison to the society at large. The
degrees of kinship within a family furnish an identifiable structure for the
group. Nonetheless, the court made short shrift of the applicant's fear of
persecution due to his family membership. The court acknowledged that
both of the applicant's brothers had been granted asylum in the Federal
Republic, but pointed out that he had not kept in contact with his broth-
ers.295 More importantly, the court believed there was no evidence that
the government of Iran would persecute someone regardless of his per-
sonal conduct because of his family relationship to a third person viewed
as disloyal to Iran.296 Consequently, the court concluded that the evi-
dence did not support a finding that members of this family constituted a
particular social group persecuted in Iran.29 7
As to the claim that the applicant would be persecuted because he was
a prominent sports personality29 who had asked for asylum, the court
indicated that his first asylum request may have caused a certain stir in
Iran and have been resented for the detrimental publicity surrounding his
"desertion." 299 Four years later, by the time of his second request, the
government in Iran had changed.3"° Furthermore, the applicant was no
longer a public personality but rather an ordinary narcotics violator, and
the claim generated no publicity.3"' Although the court accepted the
idea that prominent figures who seek asylum elsewhere may be viewed
with particular hostility by their home government, the court concluded
that in this case the applicant was a "has been" who would not be so
viewed.31 2 Because the applicant was no longer prominent, there was no
need to analyze whether prominent sports figures who flee their home-
land constitute a particular social group.30 3
With regard to the tattoos, the court acknowledged that the applicant
regime to fellow prisoners he knew were loyal to Khomeini. The court believed that if he
sincerely feared persecution based on his political opinion, he would not voluntarily make that
opinion known to adherents of the current regime. Id. at 6.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 312-352.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 200-236.
295. Judgment of Aug. 16, 1984, VGK at 10.
296. Id. at 10-11.
297. Id.
298. The opinion described him as a former world champion in the ring (Weltmeister im
Ringen). Id. at 9.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 9-10. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fell from power and fled
Iran in 1979. 6 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 376 (1986).
301. Judgment of Aug. 16, 1984, VGK at 10.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 9-10.
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might be punished in Iran on account of his tattoos.3" Further, the court
conceded that it was harsh to impose criminal penalties for merely hav-
ing been tattooed. 30 5 Nonetheless, the court dismissed this aspect of the
case in one sentence. The court noted that the criminal penalties for
tattoos apply equally to all citizens of Iran.3" 6 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, no particular group has been singled out for persecution and no
social group claim for refugee status has been stated.30 7
This reasoning is specious. That a law on its face applies equally to all
citizens does not preclude the possibility that in actual effect the law falls
particularly harshly on one particular social group. For example, in a
society in which members of one minority group are traditionally tat-
tooed, legislation outlawing tattoos, although ostensibly nationwide in
application, may have been passed to harass members of this group. Sim-
ilarly, legal measures harassing private businesses, while they apply to
everyone in the nation, may constitute persecution of a particular social
group. 0 8 To refute a claim of persecution based on membership in a
particular social group, the courts must examine the criminal penalty in
question to ascertain its objective and its impact. a°
It is possible that the Kassel court did not intend to imply that perse-
cution based on membership in a particular social group is incompatible
with the existence of a facially neutral law. Instead, the court may have
viewed criminal punishment for having been tattooed as an instance of
legitimate prosecution rather than persecution.31 0 If so, the court should
have addressed the issue directly.
Although government action to enforce the penal law should not
lightly be characterized as persecution, criminalizing an activity does
not mean that all punishment for that activity must be viewed as legiti-
mate prosecution rather than illegitimate persecution. To illustrate, if a
government outlaws one religion and criminally prosecutes and impris-
ons all who practice that religion, this practice would in all likelihood
constitute persecution. An investigation into the persecution-disguised-
as-prosecution claim requires an evaluation of the government's penal
304. Id. at 8.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See supra text accompanying note 115. Although much of the harassment against the
applicants in the Polish case consisted of extra-legal measures, the analysis would have been
similar if there had been legislation outlawing private businesses. The analysis would also have
had to address the prosecution versus persecution issue, however.
309. This is the approach adopted in cases involving Republikflucht (illegal departure).
The courts examine the legislation criminalizing departure from one's homeland and the pen-
alty imposed on violators of such legislation to ascertain whether the legislation is a legitimate
travel control measure or an illegitimate suppression of political opinion. See supra note 180.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121 for a short description of the prosecution
versus persecution analysis.
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goals and of the proscribed behavior. Here the court neglected to ana-
lyze the prosecution versus persecution issue.
While it is possible to say that the court implicitly decided that the
underlying activity - having a tattoo - is not sufficiently important to
individuals or society to be beyond the bounds of what a government can
legitimately proscribe, the lack of analysis raises a serious question as to
the court's view on this issue. When the facts put forth by the asylum-
seeker are as unsympathetic as they are in this case and credibility find-
ings are directly made against the applicant, it seems more appropriate to
conclude that under different circumstances people with tattoos3" or
prominent sports figures might be deemed sufficiently homogeneous and
part of a sufficiently structured network to constitute a particular social
group.
10. Summary of the Broadly Defined Social Group Cases
Of the nine judicial decisions described above, five included claims of
persecution based on kinship or family relationships. Four of the five,
the Chinese and Rumanian applicants from landowning families and the
two Baganda applicants, were successful in gaining refugee status based
on membership in a social group. In contrast, only two of the four non-
kinship based social groups, the Polish entrepreneurs and the Iranian
homosexuals achieved refugee status.
B. Marriage Based Claims Of Social Group
The second category of social group cases in the Federal Republic also
involves asylum petitions based on family relationships. In particular,
the applicants asserted that they fear persecution based on their mar-
riage. In each of these cases the wife of an individual granted asylum in
the Federal Republic alleged that she fears persecution not for activities
she had undertaken herself, but as the spouse of someone who has a well-
founded fear of persecution. Her social group is the family of an oppo-
311. The Judgment of July 12, 1984, No. AN 4K 83 C.945, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[VGA], was another case involving tattoos. The asylum-seeker, a young man from Yugoslavia,
had large tattoos on his legs. The tattoos praised a royalist Yugoslavian general who had
fought against the partisans led by Tito, thus indicating the political opinions of the asylum-
seeker. Although the court found many of his statements concerning his fear of persecution
contradictory and unbelievable, the court was quite impressed by the tattoos. The court
pointed out that the applicant, if returned to Yugoslavia, would undergo a physical examina-
tion for his obligatory military service and the tattoos would surely be revealed at that time. If,
by chance, the tattoos escaped detection at induction, fellow soldiers would undoubtedly see
them and report the applicant to the authorities. The applicant would then be subject to prose-
cution for the subversive activity of having propaganda tattooed on his knees, and could face a
prison term of one to ten years. In light of this likely scenario, the court concluded that the
asylum-seeker had a well-founded fear of persecution. He would face this persecution because
of his tattoos. The tattoos were essential to his asylum claim, but he feared persecution for the
political opinion, not membership in the social group of people who had been tattooed. Id.
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nent of the regime.31 2
Five opinions fall into this category. The Federal Administrative
Court issued one opinion, state Administrative Courts issued three opin-
ions, and the Federal Refugee Office issued one. All were decided in
1985. A review of these five social group cases indicates that the family
relationship is always central to the analysis, but is not explicitly dis-
cussed in terms of persecution based on membership in a particular social
group. Nonetheless, the family membership itself often provides the ba-
sis for grants of asylum.
1. Kurdish Wife: Spousal Presumption Announced - Approved
The Federal Administrative Court issued an important decision in the
summer of 1985 recognizing a woman's claim for asylum based on the
activities of her husband, who had been granted asylum in the Federal
Republic in 1983. 3 'a The applicant, a Kurdish woman from Turkey, as-
serted that she had been active in Turkey in a women's political group,
Halkla Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma Dernegi, had distributed leaflets, and
participated in demonstrations.3" 4 She also alleged that her husband had
been arrested in 1979 in Turkey for his political activities as a member of
Devrimci Halkin Birgili.3 15 Furthermore, she stated that it was standard
practice in Turkey to mistreat, torture, and imprison women, holding
them as hostages to pressure their husbands and sons to turn themselves
in. 3
t 6
The lower courts reviewing this case had dismissed the applicant's
statements about her own political activity as not credible.3" 7 They had
accepted the evidence that the authorities sometimes pressure family
312. Although legislation in the United States almost automatically grants refugee status
to the spouse and children of a refugee. Supra note 97. However, similar fact patterns might
arise in the United States if the applicant is the sibling of an individual already granted asylum.
Those cases, however, would likely be deemed instances of persecution based on "political
opinion, once removed," rather than based on membership in a particular social group. See,
e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (asylum applicant's brother tortured and
imprisoned in Nicaragua for political activities; although not politically active herself, appli-
cant feared persecution based on brother's activities); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th
Cir. 1985) (asylum applicant's cousin was assassinated and his nephew disappeared in El Sal-
vador; applicant was neutral in civil strife, and feared persecution based on both his own polit-
ical opinion [neutrality] and his family relationships).
313. Judgment of July 2, 1985, Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] (Federal Administra-
tive Court), 9 C. 35.84.
314. Id. at 2-5.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. The applicant's claim had been rejected three times. Id. at 2 (noting Federal Refugee
Office's decision of June 30, 1980, the Judgment of September 15, 1981, Verwaltungsgericht
Gelsenkirchen [VGG], and the Judgment of February 7, 1984, Oberverwaltungsgericht
Nordrhein- Westfalen [OVGNW]). The North Rhine-Westphalia Court pointed out that the
applicant had not mentioned details of her political activity until late in the proceedings and
had not named specific witnesses. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic
had no information of persecution of the women's group to which the applicant belonged. Id.
at 4.
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members of political opponents to obtain information about the wherea-
bouts of these individuals, but had decided that the applicant had not
introduced sufficient proof that this had happened or would happen to
her.31
8
The Federal Administrative Court ignored the applicant's allegations
about her own political activity and focused on her status as the wife of
someone faced with persecution. The court noted that many regimes, if
unable to reach their opponents directly, put pressure on relatives of op-
ponents. 3' 9 The evidence indicated that this practice occurs in Turkey,
where wives are often held as hostages in order to flush out their hus-
bands.320 Consequently, family members of opponents face a heightened
risk of persecution. The court emphasized that in these hostage situa-
tions the spouses are persecuted themselves, although they are not perse-
cuted for their own actions or beliefs or characteristics a.3 2  Rather they
are persecuted due to their family membership. In light of this analysis
and the undisputed evidence that the applicant was Turkish, that the
relative-as-hostage situation occurred in Turkey, and that the applicant's
husband was perceived as an opponent of the government in Turkey, the
court concluded that the applicant had a legitimate fear of persecution
based on kinship.322 In addition to ruling on the applicant's claim for
asylum, the court used this occasion to enunciate a general presumption.
The court held that it will be presumed that the spouse of one deemed an
opponent of the regime will also be perceived as an opponent. 323 Accord-
ingly, based on her family relationship, the spouse is likely also to be a
target for persecution.324
318. According to the Federal Administrative Court, the Administrative Appeals Court of
North Rhine-Westphalia had held that one incident of pressure by government authorities
does not constitute political persecution. Id. at 4. More significantly, the North Rhine-West-
phalia Court ruled that pressuring a third person can constitute political persecution only if
there is an intent to persecute politically that third person himself or herself. Id. at 4-5 (citing
the Judgment of February 7, 1984, OVGNW). Since the applicant had not introduced evi-
dence of persecution triggered by her own political opinion, she was unable to prove political
persecution. Id. at 4.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Id. at 7. Information provided by the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic on
November 28, 1983. Id.
321. Id. at 8-9.
322. Id. at 9. The court stated that the lower courts had incorrectly looked only at the
applicant's own political activity, and ignored the fact that the spouse of an opponent is often
viewed as an opponent, too, regardless of her own opinions or activities. Moreover, the lower
courts had incorrectly stated that an applicant who feared being taken hostage to pressure her
husband or sons only suffered indirect results of persecution aimed at others. The court
pointed out that hostage-taking is not an indirect result in the same sense as economic difficul-
ties that may occur to the family when the husband flees. Rather the hostage is persecuted
directly, based on family membership. Id. at 7-8.
323. Id. at 9.
324. In setting forth this presumption the court discussed the frequency with which the
political opinion of a person is imputed to his or her spouse. Id. at 7-9. Because of this empha-
sis on political opinion, it is possible to characterize this decision as a judicial opinion constru-
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2. Afghani Wife of Man Granted Refuge in the
Federal Republic of Germany
In 1985 the Administrative Court of Ansbach had occasion to discuss
a similar situation.3 25 The applicant's husband had been granted asylum
in the Federal Republic in 1981. Before he fled Afghanistan, the appli-
cant's husband had supported the Afghani resistance movement, and as a
result had had his property confiscated.326 After her husband left Af-
ghanistan, the regime harassed his wife. Deciding that she was unable to
continue there as a woman alone, the applicant fled Afghanistan on foot
in 1982. She obtained a visa from the Federal Republic's embassy in
Pakistan and flew to Germany.a27
The Federal Refugee Office rejected her asylum claim, 328stressing that
the regime had not seized the house when it confiscated the rest of the
property. 329 Therefore, the agency concluded, the government was not
trying to destroy the applicant's means of existence. The agency also
ruled that the questioning and harassment she had faced concerning her
husband's whereabouts did not constitute persecution. 330
In reversing the agency's decision, the court emphasized that the appli-
cant was endangered in Afghanistan due to her family relationship. The
court noted that the Afghani regime often retaliates against political op-
ponents by persecuting their close relatives, who are not themselves ac-
cused of anything other than kinship.33' The regime does this in order to
pressure the relatives into revealing information about the opposition and
because it presumes the relatives often secretly support the resistance
movement. 332 Accordingly, because of her close relationship to him, the
wife of someone perceived to be an opponent of the regime faces harass-
ment, mistreatment, and worse.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that there was a good chance that the
regime knew that the applicant's husband had been granted asylum in
the Federal Republic and that she had also sought asylum there.333
Therefore, the court believed, if she returned to Afghanistan she was
likely to be considered as a spy either for her husband or for the Federal
ing the term "persecution based on political opinion" as well as the term "persecution based on
membership in a particular social group."
325. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1985, No. AN 19 K 84 C.837, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[VGA].
326. Id. at 2-3.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 3 (citing Federal Refugee Office decision of July 26, 1984).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 3.
331. Id. at 7. The court based its conclusion in part on information provided by the For-
eign Ministry of the Federal Republic on March 8, 1984, filed in the Asylum Documentation
Center maintained by the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, supra note 19.
332. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1985, VGA at 7.
333. Id. at 9.
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Republic. 3 Thus, the applicant's situation as the wife of an Afghani
refugee in Germany might itself trigger arrest and punishment. As a
consequence, she had a well-founded fear of persecution based on her
family relationship.
In reaching this decision the court appeared influenced by two factors:
the treatment of political opponents in Afghanistan and the position of
women there.33 5 The court stated that in Afghanistan political oppo-
nents are denied jobs, denied promotions, fired from jobs, jailed, and tor-
tured. Their property is seized and many who go to prison do not
survive. In addition, their wives and children may be imprisoned and
shot.336
According to the court, the regime uses the inferior social role of wo-
men to injure women further.3 37 Women are deemed to obey their hus-
bands in every respect, and thus act to advance the husbands' political
goals. Whatever the husband does is attributed to the wife, and his per-
secution is likely to become hers. 338 Furthermore, the court noted that
the applicant, if forced to return, would be a woman alone, lacking the
protection of her husband in a society where male assistance is essen-
tial. 339 The court rejected the agency's argument that this vulnerability
is immaterial to the asylum claim. The court stated that this situation,
while in part a function of the position of women in Afghanistan society,
was also in part a result of the persecution that drove the applicant's
husband away.3 ° As a consequence, it was relevant to the applicant's
request for asylum. In sum, the court concluded that the cumulative
effect of these factors - the wife of an opponent to the regime, a woman
who due to persecution lacks male protection in Afghanistan, and an
individual who herself has filed an asylum application - demonstrated
that this applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution.341
334. Id. The court stated that Afghanis who return to Afghanistan after applying for asy-
lum in the Federal Republic do not inevitably face persecution. Only those perceived as polit-
ical opponents of the regime, independently of their asylum application, are persecuted. Here,
the court concluded that, based on the circumstances surrounding both the husband and wife,
including the fact that both had filed applications for asylum, the applicant would likely face
persecution upon return. Id.
335. Id. In addition to these factors, the court's extremely negative view of the Afghan
regime may have played a role. The court referred to the absence of a tradition of rule of law
in Afghanistan, the untrammelled arbitrary discretion exercised by the authorities, and the
secret police authorization to spy on the public and to arrest, interrogate, and confiscate prop-
erty arbitrarily. Id. at 6-8.
336. See id. at 7-8.
337. See id.
338. Id. at 8. This line of reasoning could easily support the conclusion that the wives
have a well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion -- the opinion automatically
attributed to them - as well as based on their family relationship.
339. Id. at 9.
340. See id.
341. Id. at 5.
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3. Afghani Wife of Guerilla Leader-Arms Dealer - Approved
The Administrative Appeals Court of North Rhine-Westphalia also
reviewed an asylum claim in 1985 by the wife of an Afghani guerilla.342
The husband had been a leader in the Afghani resistance. 343 He came
from a prominent family and had a prosperous business in Kabul. He
gave up the business to aid the guerrillas in obtaining and distributing
weapons. Twice he survived assassination attempts before he finally fled
with his wife and four children to the Federal Republic in 1980.'" The
court believed the husband's statement and concluded that he faced a
great likelihood of persecution - indeed, execution - if he returned to
Afghanistan.345
The court then examined the wife's claim. The wife asserted that she
feared persecution based on her family relationship to her husband. In
deciding whether she, too, had a fear of persecution, the court said it was
necessary to look at the general conditions in the homeland, the promi-
nence of the family involved, and the frequency with which the govern-
ment uses family members as hostages to pressure opponents. 46 Because
the current conditions in Afghanistan were chaotic, the applicant's hus-
band was a prominent person known to the regime as an active opponent,
and the applicant was closely related to him, the court concluded that
she was likely to face arrest and interrogation if she returned.3 47 Accord-
ingly, based on her family relationship alone, she had a well-founded fear
of persecution.
Surprisingly, after granting refugee status to husband and wife, the
court denied refugee status to their four young children.3 48 The court
concluded that the Afghani regime was not likely to harm young chil-
dren in order to pressure their parents, and was not likely to blame chil-
dren for their parents' decisions to seek asylum in the Federal
Republic. 34  If returned to Afghanistan, the children were likely to face
political education and indoctrination, but the court pointed out this ap-
plied to Afghani children in general and did not constitute persecu-
342. Judgment of May 14, 1985, No. 20 A 10046/84, Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-
Westfalen [OVGNW].
343. The judicial opinion reviewed as one case the asylum request of the husband, wife,
and children. Id. at 2-4, 7.
344. Id. at 3.
345. Id. at 3, 7.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 7-9. According to the court, which relied on information provided by the For-
eign Ministry of the Federal Republic, the Afghani regime at that time frequently did not put
pressure on family members of political opponents in general, but only on those family mem-
bers suspected of assisting the opponent or having information about his activities. Nonethe-
less, because the applicant was a close relative of a guerilla leader known to the regime and the
subject of two assassination attempts, she would likely be pressured. Id.
348. Id. at 10.
349. Id. at 9-11.
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tion.35° Consequently, the four children, all of whom were under the age
of twelve, were denied asylum.351' Thus, mere membership in the family
did not suffice as a basis for asylum. Family membership was an ade-
quate basis only for those, such as wives, whom the regime was likely to
hold hostage or otherwise pressure.352 In other words, the evidence
showed that certain members of families were likely to face persecution
based on their kinship, but other members were not.
4. Lebanese Wife of Man Granted Refuge in
the Federal Republic of Germany - Denied
In contrast to the North Rhine-Westphalia court's analysis of the asy-
lum application of a wife of an Afghani asylum-seeker, the Administra-
tive Court of Ansbach denied asylum in 1985 to an applicant alleging
fear of persecution based on her family relationship to a man granted
asylum in the Federal Republic. 353 The applicant was a Lebanese wo-
man married to a Palestinian. The couple had lived in Beirut. The hus-
band alleged that Syrian soldiers in Beirut had pressured him to spy on
Palestinian organizations, but that he had repeatedly refused."' As a
result of his refusal, Syrian soldiers stopped him on the street one day in
1978 and took him to an office. A quarrel broke out in the office and he
left, heading for his wife's family's nearby house. The soldiers shot at
him, wounding him and his wife, and killing his mother-in-law.3 55 The
applicant argued that this gunfight and the harassment of her husband
demonstrated that she, as his wife, was likely to face persecution if she
returned to Lebanon.356
The court disagreed. The shooting had occurred seven years earlier,
and the court believed that even at that time the applicant had been
merely a tangential figure.35' The gunfire had been directed at her hus-
band and she had just happened to be in the way. Although her husband
had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to Lebanon, the
court did not believe that his wife's fears were well-founded.358 If the
applicant went back to Lebanon alone, according to the court, she at
most would fear persecution merely based on her marriage to a Palestin-
350. Id. This decision did not mean that the children would be deported from the Federal
Republic. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
351. Id. Judgment of May 14, 1985, OVGNW at 9-10.
352. Id. at 11.
353. Judgment of May 9, 1985, No. AN 19 K 80 C1589, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[VGA].
354. Id. at 2-3.
355. The applicant was engaged, but not yet married, at the time of this incident. Id. at 2,
5.
356. Id. at 5.
357. Id.
358. The court expressed considerable doubt as to whether the incident had ever occurred,
but assumed for the purpose of analysis that it had taken place. Id. at 5.
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ian. 359 The court discounted the significance of this family relationship
to a Palestinian refugee as basis for persecution. In support of its conclu-
sion, the court emphasized that the applicant's father continued to live
unmolested in Lebanon.3 ° Although the applicant had alleged that two
of her brothers had been killed and another brother abducted due to her
marriage to a Palestinian, 6' the evidence concerning her father per-
suaded the court that the testimony concerning persecution based on
family relationship was not credible.362 Unlike the North Rhine-West-
phalia court in the Afghani case previously described,363 the Ansbach
court did not address the possibility that some individuals, such as wives,
might be persecuted based on family relationship while other individuals
in the same family, such as children or perhaps fathers-in-law, might not
be harassed.
Moreover, in contrast to the Afghani case decided favorably during
the same year by judges of the same court in Ansbach,36 the Ansbach
court here adopted an unsympathetic view of the applicant's position as a
woman left alone due to persecution. The court acknowledged that if the
applicant returned to Lebanon she would face a dangerous situation and
would be without the basic means of existence. 365 The court did not at-
tribute this precarious position to the asylum-seeker's marriage to a Pal-
estinian who had been forced to flee Lebanon. Instead, the court
dismissed it as a general fact of life for Lebanese citizens caught in a war-
torn country.36 6 There was no mention of the difficult lot of a woman left
alone in a society where male protection is crucial.
Although a more sympathetic court could have characterized the con-
ditions in Beirut as similar to those in Afghanistan, it is possible to distin-
guish the two situations. The evidence of persecution based on family
relationship was stronger in the Afghani cases. There the applicants had
established that dangerous conditions existed in their homelands and that
their husbands were perceived as opponents of the regime. In addition,
they had demonstrated that a practice existed of using wives and mothers
as hostages in order to gain information about and put pressure on the
opposition groups. The Lebanese applicant had submitted no such evi-
dence. Her exposure to gunfire and harassment had occurred seven years
359. Id. at 5.
360. Id. at 6.
361. Id.
362. Id. The court did not explicitly make a finding of credibility, but it expressed great
doubt about whether the crucial shooting incident had occurred and it obviously believed that
the applicant's family was not persecuted merely based on the fact of her marriage to a Pales-
tinian. Id. at 5-6.
363. See supra note 342.
364. See supra note 325.
365. Judgment of May 9, 1985, VGA at 6-7.
366. Id.
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earlier; her claim was stale and the danger to her was perhaps only
incidental.
5. Ethiopian Wife Denied After Husband Granted Asylum in the
Federal Republic of Germany - Denied
In the last case in this category, the Federal Refugee Office rejected an
Eritrean woman's claim of persecution based on her family relation-
ship.367 The Federal Refugee Office adopted an analysis similar to that
employed in the Lebanese case by the Administrative Court in An-
sbach a68 The applicant's husband had been an active member of the
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) resistance movement.369 He
had fled Ethiopia and received asylum in the Federal Republic in 1983.
The applicant alleged that she herself had been a member of the EPLF
women's group, had attended training sessions and meetings, and had
gathered food for the guerilla fighters.370 After her husband fled, the
government security forces kept her under constant surveillance,
searched for her husband, and asked her about his whereabouts. She
asserted that based on her own political activity and her family relation-
ship to her husband, a known opponent of the regime, she would face
persecution if she returned to Ethiopia. In addition, she would face pros-
ecution for illegally leaving Ethiopia.37" '
The Federal Refugee Office did not agree. Insofar as her asylum claim
rested on her own acts, the Federal Refugee Office dismissed her activity
as insignificant behavior that was unlikely to trigger persecution. The
agency concluded that at the most she was a sympathizer, not a person
the government would target for persecution. 72 The Federal Refugee
Office treated the family relationship claim more seriously, although it
ultimately rejected the asylum application. As the Ansbach court did in
the Lebanese case, the agency emphasized that there was no evidence
that family members are used as hostages to try to pressure political op-
ponents of the regime.3" 3 Indeed, evidence pointed to the contrary con-
clusion. As a rule, Ethiopia allows relatives of political opponents to
leave and follow their husbands, parents, or siblings to the Federal Re-
public of Germany to claim asylum.
37 4
Moreover, the agency examined the actions directed at the applicant
367. Decision of Nov. 11, 1985, No. 225-03941-85, Bundesamtfir die Anerkennung Aus-
lUndischer Fluichtlinge [BAAF] (Federal Refugee Office).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 353-366.
369. Decision of Nov. 11, 1985, BAAF at 1-3.
370. Id. at 2.
371. Id. at 3.
372. Id. at 4-5.
373. Id. at 6-7.
374. Id. at 4. On this point the Federal Refugee Office referred to expert testimony sub-
mitted in earlier cases. Id. at 4 (citing Judgment of Apr. 3, 1984, No. A 13 K 4109/82,
Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VGS]).
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before she left Ethiopia and concluded that this evidence indicated she
was not likely to face persecution if she returned. Although she had been
the subject of surveillance and questioning about her husband's wherea-
bouts, this did not constitute persecution. The government had made no
threats against her and had done nothing more than question her about
her husband. 75 Thus, the past treatment of the applicant supplied no
basis for predicting persecution against her in the future. Furthermore,
based on evidence provided by the West German Foreign Ministry that
Ethiopia does not enforce criminal penalties for illegal departure, the
agency discounted the significance of the applicant's illegal departure
from Ethiopia. 76 As a result, the agency ruled that neither the appli-
cant's activity in the past nor her more recent action in leaving Ethiopia
was likely to trigger persecution.377 Nor was her family relationship to
an active opponent of the regime, who had been granted asylum in the
Federal Republic, likely to make her a target for persecution. Accord-
ingly, the agency rejected her asylum application and that of her chil-
dren.37 8 The dispositive factor in rejecting this claim of persecution
based on family relationship was the lack of evidence of a government
practice of incarcerating or otherwise pressuring members of the families
of political opponents.3 79 Thus, the social group claim itself was not re-
jected; the case foundered on inability to prove persecution.
IV. RECOGNIZED SOCIAL GROUPS IN GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE
Examining the evidence in terms of the particular social groups con-
sidered by the courts, success came to the petit bourgeoisie owners of
private businesses (Poland), the children of prosperous landowners
(China, Rumania), homosexuals (Iran), and members of traditional Af-
rican groups (the Baganda in Uganda). The unsuccessful social group
claimants included those who marry out of caste (India) or belong to an
activist women's rights organization (India), government officials ac-
cused of corruption (Ghana), prominent sports figures (Iran), and people
with tattoos (Iran). Family relationships and kinship were important.
Immediate family members (China, Rumania) and members of more ex-
tended kinship groups (Baganda) satisfied the courts that the persecution
they feared was based on their relations. Women alleging persecution
375. Id. at 5.
376. Id. at 6 (referring to Judgment of May 21, 1985,No. 510-516/7494, Verwaltungsger-
icht Stuttgart [VGS]; Judgment of March 29, 1985, No. 510-516/80, Verwaltungsgericht K6"n
[VGK]; Judgment of June 6, 1984, No. 510-516/6719, Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg [VGHI).
377. Id.
378. Id. The court relied on evidence that Ethiopia did not persecute minor children for
the political activity or illegal departure of their parents. Id. at 5. Further, the court noted
that the children of the applicant were under the age of nine, the age of criminal responsibility
in Ethiopia, and thus would face no penalties. Id. at 7.
379. Id.
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based on family relationship were successful when there was evidence of
hostage-taking as a means of pressuring husbands and sons (Afghanistan,
Turkey) and unsuccessful when such evidence was absent (Lebanon,
Ethiopia). In sum, the family was a social group within the meaning of
the Geneva Convention definition, but the evidence of persecution of a
particular family was sometimes lacking.
Membership in a family or other kinship group was not the only ave-
nue to success for a social group claim, however. The courts recognized
that private business owners in Poland and homosexuals in Iran formed
particular social groups. In addition, the courts suggested that in certain
situations a group of criminal offenders could constitute a social group
for purposes of the refugee definition. The courts also indicated that wo-
men marrying out of caste may be deemed a social group, as may women
belonging to a women's rights organization, though the inability to prove
government sponsored or abetted persecution may prevent members of
these groups from acquiring refugee status.
Turning from the particular social group claim proffered to the asy-
lum-seeker's country of origin, people with social group claims from the
following countries prevailed: Poland, China, Uganda, Rumania, Af-
ghanistan, and Turkey (Kurds). Asylum-seekers from the following
countries were rejected: India, Ghana, Lebanon, and Ethiopia. The Ira-
nian recognition rate was fifty percent: one rejected and one accepted.
Accordingly, this small sample of opinions indicates that applicants flee-
ing communist regimes (Poland, China, Rumania, Afghanistan) have the
best chances of success. Those claiming persecution based on former or
current prosperity are especially likely to be successful (China, Poland,
Rumania, and also the Baganda in Uganda).
The analyses of what constitutes a particular social group within the
meaning of the Geneva Convention are cursory at best. The Administra-
tive Court in Hannover indicated that it believed a certain homogeneity
of group members and an internal group structure were necessary ele-
ments. Under such an approach, the Baganda, a large group of people
with a long historical tradition and self-definition and an elaborate hier-
archical structure, might be the only group that qualifies. Whereas some
might conclude that homosexuals satisfy the homogeneity requirement,
others are likely to believe that the individual differences of homosexuals
significantly outweigh their similarities and thus defeat any homogeneity
claim. In addition, homosexuals would not likely be able to show an
internal group structure. Prosperous landowners might not be very simi-
lar to one another in any respect other than prosperity, and would likely
lack an internal group structure. If the landowners were also some form
of nobility or aristocracy, however, the group structure requirement
would be satisfied and possibly the homogeneity element also. The petit
bourgeoisie, on the other hand, would probably lack an internal group
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structure, and would probably be different from each other in so many
respects other than their economic base that they would not satisfy the
homogeneity requirement either.
These few examples from the cases demonstrate that the two require-
ments suggested by the Hannover court do not appear well-suited to de-
fine a particular social group that faces persecution. Although
governments reviewing asylum applications have a legitimate interest in
defining the particular social group term so that it is not utterly amor-
phous, many groups that can be clearly identified, limited in scope, and
recognized as frequent targets of persecution would not satisfy the defini-
tion proffered by the Hannover court. In particular, homosexuals, indi-
viduals who marry out of caste, large landowners, students, and owners
of small businesses all would fall outside the refugee definition, no matter
how clearly targeted by the government for persecution due to their
group membership.
The Administrative Court in Wiesbaden suggested a more useful ap-
proach to identifying a particular social group for purposes of the Ge-
neva Convention.3 80 The court focused on two questions. First, is the
alleged group actually perceived by the general population as a group,
rather than just an agglomeration of individuals? Second, is the group
viewed in strongly negative terms? In short, are they deemed pariahs?
This approach is better suited to the reality of persecution. Although
persecution is often based on centuries-old grounds of enmity, bitterness,
and prejudice, the dark side of human nature also inspires innovation.
The Wiesbaden court's analysis is flexible enough to allow the refugee
definition to expand in response to new bases of persecution. At the
same time, the court places limits on the particular social group term by
requiring that an asylum-seeker claiming persecution based on member-
ship in a particular social group must show that there is a societal per-
ception that a group exists and that individuals face severe hardship
merely because they are members of the group. As a consequence, it is
not possible for everyone who feels persecuted to declare himself perse-
cuted as part of a particular social group and, accordingly, to warrant
protection of the Geneva Convention.
The Wiesbaden court's suggestion that the socially identifiable groups
must be perceived as pariahs is perhaps too stringent a requirement, how-
ever. Although many governments are likely to persecute those groups
viewed with great distaste by the general population, other governments
with less concern about keeping in tune with the general population's
prejudices - - perhaps because they have more control over the citizenry -
- may persecute groups against whom the society at large does not have
intense negative feelings. For example, there is no indication that the
380. See supra notes 143-162 and accompanying text.
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Polish people in general view the Polish petit bourgeoisie with extreme
distaste. In the 1970's and early 1980's the private businesses were, how-
ever, a thorn in the side of the government and were perceived by the
government as a social and economic problem to be uprooted. Concern-
ing the other social group claims asserted in the cases described above,
societal views of homosexuals, women who marry out of caste, and pre-
revolutionary large estate holders (in a post-revolutionary society) may
be sufficiently negative that these groups can accurately be deemed pari-
ahs in their societies. On the other hand, the Baganda, although bitterly
resented, appear to be viewed more with envy than disgust. Yet those
Baganda persecuted merely because of their group membership should be
protected as well as those homosexuals persecuted solely because of their
sexual disposition. Accordingly, while groups viewed as pariahs should
certainly be protected from persecution, the Geneva Convention should
also protect those individuals persecuted due to their membership in an
envied and resented social group.
An unarticulated concern running through the decisions involving
claims for refugee status based on membership in a particular social
group may be the fear that adopting a broad definition of social group
will open the floodgates to asylum-seekers. This concern is especially
heightened in the Federal Republic of Germany. Unlike the laws of most
other countries,3"' the Constitution of the Federal Republic guarantees a
right of asylum to all victims of political persecution, no matter their
nationality or lack of connections with Germany.3"2 In contrast, the Ge-
neva Convention binds its signatories to recognize as refugees those who
fall within its definition, but does not obligate the signatories to grant
381. E.g., the Italian Constitution provides: "A foreigner to whom the practical exercise
in his own country of democratic freedoms, guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, is pre-
cluded, is entitled to the right to asylum within the territory of the Republic, under the condi-
tions laid down by law." La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Constitution) art. X, 3
(Italy). This asylum provision is extremely broad, as the Italian Constitution guarantees,
among others, the following "democratic freedoms":
All citizens are invested with equal social status and are equal before the law, without
distinction as to sex, race, language, religion, political opinions and personal or social
conditions. (art. 3)... All religious denominations are equally free before the law. (art.
8). . . Citizens are entitled to form associations without authorization for reasons not
forbidden to individuals by criminal law. (art. 18) ... All are entitled to freely profess
their religious convictions in any form, individually or in associations, to propagate
them and to celebrate them in public or in private, save in the case of rites contrary to
morality. (art. 19) . . . All are entitled freely to express their thoughts by word of
mouth, in writing and by all other means of communication. (art. 21)
Unfortunately the constitutional guarantee of asylum is only aspirational. In the years since
the Constitution was adopted in 1948, no legislation has been enacted to implement the asylum
provision. Interview with Professor Bruno Nascimbene, University of Milan, in Hamburg,
Federal Republic of Germany (Nov. 28, 1986). In contrast, there is no mention of asylum or
refugees in the United States Constitution. The rights to refugee status and asylum are matters
of treaty and statutory law. See Protocol, supra note 1, and Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 4.
382. See supra note 28.
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asylum to those recognized as refugees.383 Consequently, the Ansbach
court may have feared that granting refugee status to a woman perse-
cuted based on her marriage out of caste and/or membership in a wo-
men's rights organization would entitle most women on the Indian
subcontinent to asylum in the Federal Republic. If this concern
animated the court, it unnecessarily led to a distorted result. The facts of
this case were sufficiently narrow-women marrying out of caste-that
they do not throw open the borders of the Federal Republic to millions of
Indian refugees.38 4 Moreover, the facts showing persecution were com-
pelling. This was no hypothetical situation. The applicant had received
death threats and had been physically attacked. She had been specifically
targeted for persecution. Only a relatively small number of refugees are
likely to be in her circumstances, and they clearly need protection.
A similar concern may have led to the result in the Ghanaian case.
The judges may have been influenced, at least subconsciously, by the
thought that if they reached the opposite conclusion corrupt officials
from nations around the world might flock to the Federal Republic seek-
ing asylum when their wrongdoing is unmasked. The social group posed
by the applicant, corrupt government officials, is a large one, one that
people voluntarily choose to join (as opposed to being born into); and one
whose defining characteristic is antisocial conduct and criminal behavior.
In light of these facts, it would have been astonishing if the court had
recognized corrupt officials as a particular social group.
This issue may also have influenced the court's rejection of the claim
based on being tattooed. Unmentioned by the court, but perhaps an un-
derlying concern, is the fact that tattoos are essentially self-inflicted and
are relatively easy to procure. If people who have tattoos comprise a
particular social group, a very large segment of the population can easily
transform themselves into individuals with a recognized claim to asylum
383. Article IA of the Geneva Convention defines those entitled to refugee status, supra
note 3, but article 32 allows signatories to expel aliens with refugee status if they are unlawfully
present, i.e., if the government has decided not to grant them the right to stay. Article 33
limits a government's action by forbidding a signatory from returning asylum-seekers to coun-
tries where their lives or freedom will be threatened. Even when it is applicable, Article 33
does not require a nation to grant durable asylum to the asylum-seeker. Rather the nation is
free to seek other countries that may be willing to accept the asylum-seeker. In the interim
asylum-seekers remain in a limbo status without the right to settle there.
384. In contrast to the number of women who marry a man of a lower caste and suffer
severely on account of their marriage, the number of women who are members of women's
rights groups is potentially much larger. Moreover, the social condemnation associated with
membership in women's rights organizations is likely to be less than that triggered by out-of-
caste marriages. Accordingly, if this case were categorized as a social group composed of
members in a women's rights organization, the concern might arise that individuals might join
these organizations in order to create grounds for asylum in the Federal Republic rather than
based on sincere beliefs. If such were the case, one could understand, if not agree with, a
government concern about attracting huge numbers of asylum-seekers from India and henc :
rejection of this applicant's claim for asylum. This case, however, could easily have been de-
cided solely on the much narrower out-of-caste marriage ground, thus obviating any misplaced
floodgate concern.
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in the Federal Republic. Such a scenario would obviously raise concerns
about both the sincerity of the asylum-seekers' claim to need asylum and
the numbers of asylum-seekers the Federal Republic might have to ab-
sorb. These pragmatic considerations may have encouraged the court to
dismiss in a cursory fashion the claim that individuals with tattoos - but
lacking in other shared circumstances - form a particular social group
within the meaning of the Geneva Convention.
Although it is important to keep this floodgate issue in mind, the opin-
ions reviewed here demonstrate that it is not necessarily a dispositive
factor in any particular case. If it were, the conclusions in the cases
brought by the Chinese landowner, Iranian homosexual, and possibly the
Bagandan asylum-seekers would have been different. The court would
have rejected the Chinese applicant's claim, presented as it was with no
corroborative evidence and with a story millions could tell. Although
the court undoubtedly considered the difficulty of leaving China and
making one's way to the Federal Republic, in contrast to the ease with
which one can leave India and fly to Germany, any worry that the deci-
sion created a magnet for Chinese asylum-seekers was muted.385 Simi-
larly, the opinions that seem to invite all homosexuals in Iran and all the
Baganda people in Uganda to apply for asylum in West Germany cannot
be squared with a floodgate mentality.386
The success rate of the asylum-seekers in the opinions reviewed here is
quite high. Of the fourteen applicants, all of whom had been rejected by
the Federal Refugee Office for the Recognition of Refugees, nine asylum-
seekers won refugee status. Thirteen applicants sought judicial review
and reversal of the Federal Refugee Office's decisions, and nine were suc-
cessful. Based on these results, one might conclude that the Federal Ref-
ugee Office rejects all asylum applicants and that there is a seventy
percent reversal rate of Federal Refugee Office decisions denying refugee
status. That conclusion is incorrect. During 1986 the Federal Refugee
Office recognized as refugees approximately sixteen percent of the appli-
385. In contrast to the Chinese case, however, the Rumanian case posed a social group
with far fewer members. The size of the pre-revolutionary landowning class in Rumania is
much smaller in terms of absolute numbers than its counterpart in China. Moreover, the
circumstances of the Rumanian applicant's case indicated that her social group was in fact a
small subset of the group with large landholdings. In addition to owning land, her family
appeared to be educated, privileged, and politically well-connected. Supra notes 184-199 and
accompanying text.
386. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the size of the social group recognized by the
court. Estimates of the Baganda population in Uganda are in the range of three million, or one
quarter of the country's total population, supra note 213. This is a large group, and both the
Cologne and the Ansbach decisions can fairly be read to render eligible for refugee status most
people who can prove that they are members of the Baganda. Despite its size, however, the
group is much smaller than the group an earlier case may have envisioned: most of the women
on the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, if increasing numbers of Baganda asylum-seekers make
their way to the Federal Republic, the courts are likely to scrutinize more closely the evidence
concerning the ill-treatment of the Baganda to determine the intensity and the scope of the
likely harm.
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cants whose cases it decided.38 In 1987 the recognition rate dropped to
9.4 percent.3"' The courts do not reverse the Federal Refugee Office fre-
quently. Approximately five percent of the applicants who file challenges
to the Federal Refugee Office's denial of their refugee claims are
successful.3 89
Attempts to find an explanation for the discrepancy between the over-
all statistics and the statistics yielded by the cases described here have
been unsuccessful. Based on the information currently available, it ap-
pears that the exceptionally high success rate in these cases is not repre-
sentative, and a result of the small sample of cases in which social group
claims have been asserted.
CONCLUSION
The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees pro-
tects those who are persecuted based on membership in a particular so-
cial group. The courts of the Federal Republic of Germany have
interpreted the constitutional right to asylum to include victims of perse-
cution based on social group. During the 1980's German courts re-
viewed claims of social group based persecution from many lands. These
judicial opinions, translated here into English for the first time, recognize
as social groups private entrepreneurs in a state-run economy, homosex-
uals, members of prosperous landowning families, and members of tradi-
tional African kinship groups. In addition, the German courts view
women held hostage in order to pressure their husbands and sons as vic-
tims of persecution based on membership in a particular social group
comprised of immediate family members. Moreover, the opinions indi-
cate that in certain circumstances, women who marry out of caste, wo-
men who belong to women's rights organizations, and groups of criminal
offenders may constitute a social group within the meaning of the Ge-
neva Convention and the Federal Republic's Constitution.
Although the judicial opinions surveying social group claims proffered
relatively little analysis of the social group term, several courts suggested
guideposts. One analysis looked for homogeneity among group members
and some sort of internal group structure. Another examined whether
members of the society from which the asylum-seeker came viewed the
group as a genuine group rather than just a collection of individuals. If
so, the court inquired as to whether the group was viewed in strongly
387. von Pollern, Die Entwicklung der Asylbewerberzahlen im Jahre 1987 [The Growing
Numbers of Asylum Applicants in 1987], 2/1988. ZAR, Zeitschrift fur A uslanderrecht und Aus-
ldnderpolitik [J. OF ALIENS L. & POL'Y 1 61, 64. In the late 1970's and early 1980's the average
recognition rate by the Federal Refugee Office hovered around 10%. Aleinikoff, supra note 27,
at 200.
388. Id.
389. Aleinikoff, supra note 27, at 206.
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negative terms. While neither of these approaches may provide the defin-
itive social group analysis, both can be helpful to refugee advocates in the
United States. They may help breathe life into a little used term of art in
refugee law and thus extend protection to individuals persecuted based
on their membership in a particular social group.
